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Marketing managers are often challenged to show, in the language of finance, that 
marketing expenditures enhance financial performances.  Responding to this call, the first 
essay examines the impact of a firm’s advertising and research and development (R&D) 
on the systematic risk of its stock, a key finance metric for publicly listed firms.  
Integrating developments in the accounting, finance, and marketing literatures, we 
propose that both a firm’s advertising and R&D will create market-based assets that will 
insulate the firm from changes in the stock market, thereby lowering its systematic risk.  
After controlling for factors that accounting and finance researchers have shown to be 
associated with the systematic risk, we find that a firm’s advertising and R&D lower its 
systematic risk.  For theory, the findings extend prior research that has focused on the 
effect of marketing initiatives on performance metrics without consideration of the 
impact of those initiatives on the firm’s systematic risk.  For practice, the ability of 
advertising and R&D to reduce systematic risk highlights the multi-faceted financial 
 vii 
implications of marketing programs.  This study’s findings may also surprise senior 
management and finance executives who are skeptical of the financial accountability of 
marketing programs. 
In the second essay, we extend the existing literature to identify a fundamental 
signal from advertising (SADV) which the stock market and financial analysts might 
recognize as value-relevant information.  We find that increases in the proposed 
advertising signal increase the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) after controlling 
for the accounting and finance variables known to affect CAR.  However, surprisingly, 
we find that the value-relevant advertising signal (SADV) is not related to financial 
analysts’ expectation of firm value and their earnings forecasts, and that SADV increases 
the errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  We thus provide empirical evidence that 
analysts under-react to the fundamental advertising signal, SADV, despite the fact that the 
measure is impounded in firms’ stock prices.  With the findings, this study joins a 
growing literature that demonstrates a link between marketing and financial value of a 
firm, and furthermore encourages finance professionals’ better understanding of 
marketing accountability.  
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ESSAY 1: ADVERTISING, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND 
SYSTEMATIC RISK OF THE FIRM 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a growing consensus that senior management and finance executives 
focus on maximizing shareholder value and do not value marketing performance metrics 
(e.g., awareness, sales growth, loyalty, customer satisfaction, repeat purchase), because 
they do not understand how or even whether these metrics are of interest to the firm’s 
shareholders  (Ambler 2003).  Consequently, marketing executives are urged to “speak in 
the language of finance” with their finance colleagues and senior management 
(Srivastava and Reibstein 2004) because financial return is the dialogue required to 
access funds from the financial purse strings that are crucial for the implementation of 
marketing programs.  To address this gap, in this essay, we examine whether a firm’s 
advertising and research-and-development (R&D) expenditures affect a metric of interest 
to both finance executives and senior management: the firm’s “systematic risk,” or β.1  
We first provide the motivation for the study.  
 
Portfolio theory (Lintner 1965; Sharpe 1964), a key development in finance, 
posits that investors can diversify away a portion of the risk associated with a firm’s 
stock by constructing a portfolio of stocks whose returns correlate imperfectly with one 
another.  In equilibrium, the risk that is priced in the stock market is the stock’s 
                                                 
1 As we subsequently discuss, to eliminate potentially confounding effects of firm size on systematic risk, 
in the empirical estimation, we scale the firm’s advertising and R&D by its sales. 
 2 
systematic risk, which is a function of the extent to which the stock’s return changes 
when the overall market changes.2  This market-driven variation in a firm’s stock returns, 
which cannot be diversified away, is its “systematic risk,” or β.3  By construction, the 
stock market, as a whole, has a β of 1.0.  A stock whose return, in response to a change in 
the market, falls (or rises) more than does the market’s return falls (or rises) has a β above 
1.0.  If, in response to a change in the market, a stock’s return falls (or rises) less than the 
market’s return falls (or rises), its β is less than 1.0.  Thus, β, a measure of the stock’s 
sensitivity to market changes, is an important metric for publicly listed firms.  
In this essay, we examine the relationship between a firm’s advertising and R&D 
and its systematic risk.  Recent developments in the market-based assets theory 
(Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998) suggest that a firm’s advertising creates 
intangible market-based assets (e.g., brand equity) and that those assets strengthen 
performance including sales growth, market share, and profitability (Boulding and Staelin 
1995; Erickson and Jacobson 1992) and shareholder value (Joshi and Hanssens 2004; 
Rao, Agarwal, and Dahloff 2004).  We suggest that the consumer loyalty and the 
bargaining power over distribution channel partners inherent in those intangible market-
based assets help insulate the firm from the impact of stock-market downturns, thus 
lowering the firm’s systematic risk.  On the basis of developments in the finance 
literature, we propose another way that advertising-created market-based assets might 
affect a firm’s systematic risk.  Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005; p. 57) note that 
                                                 
2 Thus, beta is measured as (covariance (stock and market))/(variance (market)).  
3 We use the terms ‘systematic risk’, ‘beta’, or β to denote the systematic risk of the firm’s stock. 
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because of increased firm awareness due to advertising, all else being equal, “investors 
prefer holding stocks with high recognition and consequently, greater information 
precision.”  Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that a firm’s advertising results in 
broader ownership of the stock.  We anticipate that this broader ownership may insulate 
the stock’s return from market downturns.  
Consistent with these theoretical developments, two recent studies (Madden, 
Fehle, and Fournier 2006; Singh, Faircloth, and Nejadmalayeri 2005) have explored the 
relationship between a firm’s advertising and its systematic risk.  Singh et al. (2005) 
report a significant, negative relationship between a firm’s advertising and its systematic 
risk.  Using a sample of “best-performing firms” from the Stern-Stewart database for the 
period between 1998 and 2001, Singh et al. (2005) find that higher advertising 
expenditure (operationalized as advertising dollars) is associated with lower systematic 
risk.  Madden et al. (2006) compare the performance of three stock portfolios—a 
portfolio of firms with strong brands (using Interbrand’s measure of brand strength), a 
portfolio of firms excluding firms with strong brands, and a portfolio of all firms—and 
find that the portfolio of firms with strong brands, relative to the other two portfolios, has 
higher returns and lower systematic risk.   
Singh et al. (2005) and Madden et al. (2006) studies raise intriguing research 
questions:  Will the negative relationship between advertising (or brand strength) and 
systematic risk hold under other conditions including a more general sample that includes 
poorly performing firms, or with measures of advertising scaled for firm size (to remove 
the confounding effect of firm size)?  Will the negative relationship between advertising 
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and systematic risk hold controlling for other accounting characteristics that have been 
shown to link to a firm’s systematic risk which may vary across portfolios (but not 
controlled for in the Madden et al.’s study)?  In addition, we perceive a research 
opportunity for us to incorporate unobserved firm heterogeneity (to rule out endogeneity 
caused by omitted variables) and to use lagged predictor variables (to rule out reverse 
causality), issues that have not examined in prior research.  There is also evidence in the 
literature linking a firm’s R&D expenditure to its financial performance (Boulding and 
Staelin 1995; Capon, Farley, and Hoenig 1990; Erickson and Jacobson 1992) and 
shareholder value (Jaffe 1986).  We hypothesize that as in the case of advertising, R&D 
creates intangible market-based assets that insulate the firm from the negative impact of 
stock market downturns, thus lowering the firm’s systematic risk.   
Accordingly, we examine the impact of a firm’s advertising and R&D on its 
systematic risk, proposing that a firm’s advertising and R&D lower its systematic risk.  
We test the hypotheses using data on publicly listed firms obtained from the 
COMPUSTAT and Center for Research on Stock Prices (CRSP) databases for the period 
between 1979 and 2001, which resulted in the creation of a panel data set of 19 five-year 
moving windows with 3198 observations for 644 firms.  Following precedent in the 
finance literature (Damodaran 2001), we estimate the firm’s systematic risk, β, using 60 
months of stock returns in a five-year moving window using equal-weighted stock market 
returns.  To eliminate the potentially confounding effects of firm size on systematic risk, 
we scale the firm’s advertising and R&D expenditures by its sales.   
 5 
We control for the firm’s growth, leverage, liquidity, asset size, earnings 
variability, and dividend payout, factors that finance and accounting scholars have shown 
to be associated with its systematic risk.  The model includes two additional control 
variables that may affect a firm’s systematic risk: firm age and competitive intensity in 
the industry.  We estimate the effect of a firm’s advertising/sales and R&D/sales on its 
systematic risk using a fixed-effects model formulation that accounts for unobserved firm 
heterogeneity and serial correlation of errors.    
The results strongly support the hypotheses that higher advertising/sales and 
higher R&D/sales lower a firm’s systematic risk after controlling for factors that prior 
research has shown to be associated with systematic risk.  These two effects are robust to 
alternative estimates of systematic risk (we estimate β using value-weighted, as opposed 
to equal-weighted, market returns and relax the restriction that all 60 months of stock 
returns must be present to estimate β) and to alternative measures of advertising and 
R&D (we scale them by assets rather than by sales), and the results are not driven by 
multicollinearity.  Our findings are novel and important and hold implications for both 
marketing theory and practice.    
We organize this article as follows: In the next section, we provide a brief 
overview of systematic risk.  Following that, we develop hypotheses that relate a firm’s 
advertising and R&D to its systematic risk.  We then describe the proposed estimation 
approach, the data, the measures, and the results.  We conclude with a discussion of the 
paper’s contributions, its limitations, and opportunities for further research.    
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CHAPTER 2: AN OVERVIEW OF SYSTEMATIC RISK  
 
A central issue in portfolio theory in finance is the maximization of returns for 
individuals who invest in assets, that is, in firms’ stocks (Lintner 1965; Mossin 1966; 
Sharpe 1964).  The key idea of portfolio theory is that investors can construct a portfolio 
of stocks with imperfectly correlated returns and thus eliminate non-systematic (i.e., 
individualistic) risk associated with those stocks.  The remaining variability, the firm’s 
systematic risk, reflects the extent to which its stock’s return responds to movement of 
the average return on all stocks in the market.  That is, a firm’s systematic risk measures 
its stock’s sensitivity to market-wide events and is, referred to as, its β.    
 In 1970, Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes (hereinafter, BKS) related systematic risk to 
variables that describe the financial position of a firm.  Specifically, they suggested that 
higher systematic risk will be related to: 
 
- Higher growth because, in a competitive economy, the excessive earnings 
opportunities may erode when new firms enter the industry. 
 
- Higher leverage because the earnings stream of common shareholders becomes 
more volatile as debt increases. 
 
- Lower liquidity because liquid or current assets result in less volatile returns 
than do fixed assets. 
 
- Smaller asset size because smaller firms have higher default risk. 
 
- Lower dividend payout because the need to offer steady dividends will cause 
firms with greater volatility to pay out a lower percentage of earnings. 
 
- Higher levels of earnings variability because this will result in a lower payout to 
stockholders. 
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- Higher earnings co-variability with the market because this will result in higher 
earnings volatility again lowering the return on the stocks. 
 
 
Considering two periods (1947-1956 and 1957-1965), BKS (1) regressed the 
aforementioned firm characteristics on systematic risk in the first time period and (2) 
examined whether a model of systematic risk from time period 1 predicted systematic 
risk in time period 2 better than did systematic risk in time period 1.   
Two diverse streams of empirical research have emerged from the BKS study.  
The first stream of research, not related to this paper’s research objectives, focuses on the 
prediction of the firm’s systematic risk, β, in a future period (Elgers 1980; Eskew 1979; 
Ismail and Kim 1989).  The second stream of research, more pertinent to this paper, 
augments the predictor variables in the BKS study with additional firm characteristics 
that may explain systematic risk.  While there are several studies in this stream, our 
review indicated a lack of cumulative knowledge building in this area.  Rather, each 
study added some new variables to a subset of the variables in the BKS study.  Variables 
considered in past research include dividend policy (Bildersee 1975), financial structure 
(Hill and Stone 1980), operating leverage (Mandelker and Rhee 1984), earnings funds 
flow and cash flow (Ismail and Kim 1989), international diversification (Goldberg and 
Heflin 1995), and strategic profiles (Veliyath and Ferris 1997). 
Similarly, two studies (Bharadwaj and Menon 1993; Kroll, Wright, and Heiens 
1999) explore the relationship between aspects of a firm’s marketing strategy and its risk.  
Using service strategic business units (SBU’s) from the Profit Impact of Marketing 
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Strategy (PIMS) database, Bharadwaj and Menon (1993) find that some aspects of 
marketing (i.e., promotional expenditure, sales force expenditure, relative price) are 
associated with lower variability in return on investment while other aspects of marketing 
(i.e., advertising, customization) are associated with higher variability in return on 
investment.  Although variability in return on investment, a surrogate for total risk, 
confounds systematic risk with non-systematic risk, these results suggest a relationship 
between firms’ marketing activities and their systematic risk.  Kroll et al. (1999) consider 
a surrogate for systematic risk, the covariance of firms’ cash flows relative to a market 
portfolio of equities, and find that the superior product quality of SBU’s (again using the 
PIMS database) decreases that surrogate measure of risk.  As noted earlier, Singh et al. 
(2005) and Madden et al. (2006) find that higher levels of advertising expenditure are 
associated with lower systematic risk.  
Note that there is a vigorous, ongoing debate about the usefulness of systematic 
risk for predicting future firm value in the finance literature (Fama and French 1992).4  
However, our focus is on β as a measure of risk, not on β as a predictor of future firm 
value.  Reiterating its central role in investment practice, systematic risk, β, is an 
important metric for publicly listed firms measuring their stocks’ vulnerability to market 
downturns.  Indeed, as testimony of its importance, a review of current investment 
practices indicated that leading investment firms (e.g., Fidelity Inc., Merrill Lynch, Value 
Line) use β extensively in the construction of investment portfolios.  Thus, shareholders 
                                                 
4 Specifically, Fama and French (1992), using historical data, examine whether expected returns are better 
predicted by the firm’s past beta’s than by other variables.  Using realized average returns, they find a 
stronger empirical correlation of future firm value with a firm’s book-to-price and with size but not with the 
measure of its historic beta. 
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and senior management of publicly traded firms are very interested in β and, 
consequently, in the impact of advertising and R&D on β.   
In sum, while there is much work relating a firm’s accounting characteristics (e.g., 
dividend payout, growth, leverage, liquidity, asset size, and earnings variability)  to its 
systematic risk, we know much less about the relationship between important indicators 
of marketing strategy (e.g., advertising and R&D expenditures) and systematic risk.  
Singh et al. (2005) and Madden et al. (2006) are two exceptions.  Addressing this 
research gap, we examine the effects of a firm’s advertising and R&D, two important 
manifestations of the firm’s marketing strategy, on its systematic risk.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORY  
 
We next develop hypotheses relating a firm’s advertising and R&D to its 
systematic risk.  Note that, to eliminate the potentially confounding effects of firm size on 
systematic risk in the empirical estimation, we scale the firm’s advertising and R&D by 
its sales.  We first discuss the effects of the firm’s advertising on its systematic risk, 
followed by the effects of R&D on systematic risk.   
 
Advertising 
 
To start with, a large body of work indicates that advertising has a direct effect on 
various firm performance metrics including sales (Leone 1995), profit (Erickson and 
Jacobson 1992), and firm value (Joshi and Hanssens 2004).  Reinforcing these 
performance rewards to advertising, developments in brand equity (Aaker 1996; Keller 
1998) suggest that firms’ advertising efforts create consumer and distributor brand equity, 
an intangible market-based asset with important strategic and performance implications.  
For example, increased advertising and the resultant brand equity increase the 
differentiation of a firm’s products (Kirmani and Zeithaml 1993) and make them less 
easily substitutable (Mela, Gupta, and Lehmann 1997).  Increased brand equity also 
increases price premiums (Ailawadi, Neslin, and Lehmann 2003) and lowers price 
sensitivities (Kaul and Wittink 1995; Sethuraman and Tellis 1991).  Furthermore, 
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increased advertising and resultant higher brand equity produce an asymmetric sales 
response to sales promotions (Blattberg, Briesch, and Fox 1995), such that highly 
advertised brands are affected less (than less advertised brands) by competitors’ sales 
promotions.  
In addition to the benefits of advertising and brand equity in current product 
markets, advertising and the resultant brand equity also strengthen and stabilize the firm’s 
performance in new product markets.  For example, the brand equity of current flagship 
brands generate greater receptiveness of consumers and distribution channel partners to 
new product introductions (Kaufman, Jayachandran and Rose 2006) and will enable the 
firm to migrate customers to more profitable products and/or to cross-sell products to 
existing customers (Kamakura et al. 2003).  Thus, as suggested by Srivastava et al. 
(1998), brand equity may function as financial hedging contracts when firms enter new 
markets with new technologies.  In addition, brand equity also creates both consumer and 
distributor loyalty, acts as a barrier to competition, and provides bargaining power over 
distributors; these are all benefits that insulate a firm’s stock from market downturns and 
thus lower its systematic risk (Veliyath and Ferris 1997).  
Finally, a firm’s brand equity may also lower its systematic risk by serving as a 
capital market information channel to the firm’s stockholders (Frieder and 
Subrahmanyam 2005; Grullon et al. 2004).  Grullon et al. (2004) report that firms with 
higher advertising have higher liquidity and greater breadth of stock ownership.  Frieder 
and Subrahmanyam (2005) report that a firm’s increased brand perceptions (consistent 
with higher brand equity discussed above), a direct outcome of its increased advertising, 
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increases ownership of the firm’s stock by individual investors (relative to institutional 
investors) because of individual investors’ preferences for stocks with higher-quality 
information (advertising plays an information role for a firm’s stockholders).  This higher 
liquidity and increased breadth of ownership may help insulate the firm’s stock returns 
from market downturns, thus lowering its systematic risk.  Thus, we propose:  
H1: The higher a firm’s advertising, the lower its systematic risk. 
 
Research and Development (R&D) 
 
There is a large body of finance, management, and marketing research relating the 
intangible assets created by R&D to the firm’s financial performance.  Although there is 
a debate about the sizes of the effects of R&D investments on different performance 
metrics (Boulding and Staelin 1995; Erickson and Jacobson 1992), it is well-established 
that firms’ R&D investments generate persistent profits (Roberts 2001), high stock 
returns (Chan et al. 2001; Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Pakes 1985), and superior market 
value (Jaffe 1986).  In a meta-analysis of 210 profitability studies, Capon, Farley and 
Hoenig (1990, p. 1157) conclude, “Dollars spent on R&D have an especially strong 
relationship to increased profitability.” 
As with advertising-created market-based assets, R&D-created market-based 
assets may also insulate a firm’s stock from market downturns.  Veliyath and Ferris 
(1997) report a relationship between the strategic profile of a firm, including its 
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advertising- and R&D-driven differentiation, and its systematic risk.  Similarly, the 
number of a firm’s new product introductions lowers its systematic risk (Chaney et al. 
1991).  This relationship between R&D and systematic risk occurs because a firm which 
invests in R&D exhibits greater dynamic efficiency and greater flexibility than its 
competitors (who invest less in R&D) enabling it to adapt to environmental changes 
including in input prices, technologies, and customers (Miller and Bromiley 1990).  This 
efficiency and flexibility help insulate the firm from market downturns, thus lowering its 
systematic risk. 
We focus on the effects of a firm’s R&D, an activity with uncertain returns, on its 
systematic risk.  If the focus is on total risk (non-systematic risk and systematic risk), 
R&D may increase total risk because R&D may decrease the predictability of a firm’s 
future income streams (Kothari et al. 2002).  Analysts exhibited greater disagreement 
about year-ahead earnings for R&D intensive firms than for other firms (Barth et al. 
2001).  Another study notes that post-investment reported earnings are more highly 
variable for firms with higher R&D levels than for firms with lower R&D levels 
(Chambers et al. 2002).  To the extent that these kinds of volatility are specific to a firm 
or an industry, they are non-systematic and can be diversified away (Lubatkin and 
O'Neill 1987).  
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In summary, while extant empirical research suggests that R&D may increase a 
firm’s non-systematic risk, this literature also suggests that R&D creates strategic 
differentiation, efficiency, and flexibility, which insulate the firm from market downturns, 
thus lowering its systematic risk.  Thus, we propose: 
H2: The higher a firm’s R&D, the lower its systematic risk. 
 15 
CHAPTER 4: METHOD  
 
Data   
 
The data for this study included all firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) during the period between 1979 and 2001.  We obtained accounting, financial, 
advertising, and R&D data on firms from COMPUSTAT, and we obtained their stock 
prices for the computation of systematic risk from CRSP.  
 
Measures   
 
The dependent variable, systematic risk, is an inherently long-term construct 
capturing the extent to which a firm’s stock return co-varies with market return (Beaver, 
Kettler and Scholes 1970).  A firm’s systematic risk changes slowly over time.  We 
follow the precedent in prior finance research (Damodaran 2001) and estimate the firm’s 
systematic risk, β, using a five-year moving window.  
Accordingly, we estimate the firm’s systematic risk, β, for a five-year moving 
window using stock returns for the previous 60 months, relative to the equal-weighted 
return for the stock market for that period.  We subsequently test the robustness of the 
results to β estimates relative to the value-weighted returns and for β estimates when 
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monthly stock returns were available for at least 50 of the 60 months of the moving 
window (which allows us to increase the number of firms in the data set).  In addition, to 
avoid problems associated with very low-priced stocks, we excluded a stock from the 
five-year moving window if the average of its monthly closing stock prices was less than 
$2 (Ball et al. 1995; Hertzel et al. 2002).  Finally, we included a firm in the moving 
window only if it reported information on its advertising and R&D in COMPUSTAT for 
all years in the five-year moving window.  
Systematic Risk.  Similar to BKS’s (1970) approach, we use monthly stock data 
to compute firm i’s systematic risk measure iβ̂ , ex post, for a period by using a least 
squares regression of the form: 
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where itR  is the ex post rate of return for stock i during period t, mtR is an index of the ex 
post return for all NYSE firms during month t (i.e., the market rate of return), and iα  is 
the intercept of the fitted line of itR  using mtR . itD  is cash dividend payable on common 
stock i in month t, itP is closing price of common stock i at end of month t, 1−′itP  is closing 
price at end of month t-1 adjusted for capital changes (e.g., stock splits, and stock 
dividends), and tL and 1−tL are the Fisher’s link relative, a market price index of all firms 
on the NYSE at months t and t-1 respectively, adjusted for dividends and all capital 
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changes.  The slope of the regression equation iβ̂  is the empirical estimate of systematic 
risk iβ  of firm i. 
We obtained iβ̂ by estimating a separate regression using the monthly stock 
returns for each firm i for each five-year moving window resulting in up to 19 
observations per firm.  For the first moving window, we used the monthly stock returns 
for all firms on CRSP for 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982 and 1983 to compute the firm’s 
systematic risk, β.  For the second moving window, we used the monthly stock returns 
for firms for 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984.  For the last and 19th moving window, 
we used the monthly stock returns for all firms for 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001.  To 
ease interpretation of the results, we eliminated 52 observations where the firm’s 
estimated systematic risk was negative. 
Advertising and R&D.  We measured advertising by the mean of the firm’s 
advertising expenditure as reported in DATA45 scaled by its sales reported in DATA12 
for the five-year period from the annual data reported in COMPUSTAT.  DATA45 in 
COMPUSTAT includes the cost of advertising media (radio, television, newspapers, and 
periodicals) and promotional expenses.5  We measured R&D by the mean of the firm’s 
R&D expenditure as reported in DATA46 scaled by its sales reported in DATA12 for the 
five-year period from the annual data reported in COMPUSTAT.  Scaling the firm’s 
                                                 
5 Past research has shown that sales promotion activities negatively affect brand loyalty (Mela, Gupta, 
Lehmann and 1997) and have a nil effect on stock returns (Pauwels et. al. 2004).  We are cognizant that 
some firms may report sales promotion expenditure as a part of their advertising expenditure.  However, 
because firms do not indicate, the split between advertising and sales promotions, we assume that most 
advertising expenditures reported in DATA45 in COMPUSTAT relate to communication of product 
benefits to customers.  Thus, differences in the percent of such mis-reported advertising expenditure that 
pertains to sales promotion adds error to our estimates, making our tests of hypotheses conservative.   
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advertising and R&D expenditures by its sales rules out the alternative explanation that 
the negative effect of advertising and R&D on systematic risk may be because larger 
firms may have lower systematic risk.  We subsequently test and report that the model 
estimation results are robust to scaling of the advertising and R&D by the firm’s assets 
DATA6 (instead of its sales). 
Given the theoretical processes discussed in the hypotheses development, we 
anticipate a lagged effect of a firm’s advertising and R&D on its systematic risk.  Thus, 
we used lagged measures of advertising/sales and R&D/sales, which preclude a potential 
reverse causality explanation of the effects (Boulding and Staelin 1995).  
Accounting Variables.  Given this paper’s objective of exploring the effects of a 
firm’s advertising and R&D on its systematic risk, as accounting researchers have done, 
we use accounting variables that BKS (1970) use as control variables in our model.  
Accordingly, we included six accounting characteristics of the firm in the model: asset 
growth rate, leverage, liquidity, asset size (log), earnings variability, and dividend payout 
(see BKS (p. 666) for the logic for the operationalization of these variables).  The 
inclusion of the firm’s asset size serves as a further control for the effects of the firm’s 
size on its systematic risk.  We are unable to include covariability of earnings, which was 
included in the BKS model, because its calculation requires ten years of data.  We 
provide the definitions of these measures and the data fields from COMPUSTAT used for 
BKS’s computation in the Appendix A and in the Appendix B.  
Additional Control Variables.  We also include two additional control variables 
in the model.  First, we include the firm’s age measured by the number of years since its 
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listing on the stock market as older firms may have lower systematic risk.  Second, to 
control for industry-specific effects, following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, 
we include the industry’s competitive intensity, measured by the Herfindahl’s four-firm 
concentration ratio as the proportion of market shares of the largest four firms to the 
industry’s sales at the 2-digit standard industry classification (SIC) level.  A priori, we do 
not hypothesize the directional effect of competitive intensity.  The fixed-effects 
formulation we employ to estimate the model precludes the inclusion of time-invariant 
industry dummies in the model. 
The number of observations for which we had complete data on systematic risk, 
lagged advertising/sales, lagged R&D/sales, and the control variables is 3198 (for 644 
firms).  The number of firms in the sample by each moving window suggests that, over 
time, the number of firms in each moving window increases at first, reaches a maximum 
(N = 371 in moving window 10 (years = 1989—1993)), and then declines to N = 162 in 
the last moving window (years = 1997—2001).  This drop in the number of firms in the 
moving windows over time occurs because of missing data for advertising and R&D.  
The average value for systematic risk for all firms in a given window varies across the 
years ranging from 0.856 (window 14) to 1.140 (window 18), whereas average asset size 
(log) ranges from $6.243 million (window 14) to $4.951 million (window 6).  Lagged 
advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales vary as follows: average lagged advertising: 
highest = 0.055 in window 15 to lowest = 0.033 in window 1; average lagged R&D: 
highest = 0.088 in window 15 to lowest = 0.036 in window 1.  3% of observations 
reported zero advertising expenditure and 3.9 % of observations reported zero R&D 
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expenditure.  Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the 
measures, and Figure 1A and Figure 1B contain the frequency distribution of asset size 
(log) and systematic risk respectively of observations in the study.  
 A perusal of Table 1 and Table 2 (which we discuss in detail subsequently and 
contains the results of the model estimation) suggests that the pattern of bivariate 
correlation matrix in Table 1 is different from the pattern of regression results in Table 2.  
For example, the model estimation results in Table 2 indicate that advertising/sales and 
R&D/sales have coefficients that are negative and significant at p < 0.01.  However, in 
the bivariate correlation matrix in Table 1, the correlation between R&D/sales and β is 
positive and significant at p < 0.01, and the correlation between advertising/sales and β is 
negative, but is only significant at p < 0.10.  This “disconnect” occurs because the 
bivariate correlation matrix does not account for the fixed effects, serial correlation, or 
window dummies in our model structure.  To explore this issue further, we created an 
“adjusted” bivariate correlation matrix, wherein we remove the effects of fixed effects, 
serial correlation, and window dummies from the predictor variables by regressing fixed 
effects, serial correlation, and window dummies on each of the predictor variables and 
systematic risk.  We used the residuals from each of these regressions to create an 
adjusted correlation matrix (this and all other results not reported in the paper are 
available, on request, from the authors).  The pattern of correlations in the adjusted 
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correlation matrix corresponds closely to the regression results in Table 2.6  Thus, 
multicollinearity does not appear to be driving the results of the model.   
                                                 
6 We also performed stepwise regression analyses, adding one predictor variable at a time to the model, and 
found consistent results for the effects of lagged advertising and lagged R&D (the directionality, 
significance, and the sizes of the coefficients) across these stepwise regressions showing that there are no 
harmful effects of multicollinearity.   
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS  
 
Model Estimation Procedure   
 
As the panel data set of moving windows consists of repeated observations of 
firms, we estimated a fixed-effects, cross-sectional, time series regression model with a 
correction for serial correlation of errors (Baltagi and Wu 1999; Bhargava et al. 1982; 
Woolridge 2002).  Specifically, the model has the following structure:  
 itiitit XY ενβα +++=  i = 1,…., N;  t = 1,…., Ti and where  
ittiit ηρεε += −1,  in addition, where ρ < 1 and itη  is independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d) with mean 0 and variance ησ 2  and iν  are assumed to be fixed 
parameters that may be correlated with the covariates itX .  These itX  includes the 
accounting variables of growth, leverage, liquidity, asset size, earnings variability, 
dividend payout, age, competitive intensity, and advertising and R&D.  The failure to 
correct for serial correlation of errors, if present, can result in inflated standard errors of 
parameter estimates and incorrect tests of hypotheses.  See Bhargava, Franzini, and 
Narendranathan (1982) for the detailed statistics of the fixed-effects panel data model 
with correction for first order serial correlation of errors.7  
                                                 
7 The most frequently analyzed process in the empirical econometrics literature is the first order 
autoregression or AR(1) process where the errors across time t and t-1 are correlated.  Higher order 
processes involving several periods are both intractable and place a high burden on the researchers to 
justify more complex time series processes.  Thus, as noted by Greene (2003; p. 257), “the first-order 
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We estimate the model using the xtregar procedure in STATA 9.0.  In addition to 
the predictor variables of lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales, we also include 
the BKS control variables and the two additional control variables of age and competitive 
intensity.  As discussed earlier, we used lagged measures of advertising/sales and 
R&D/sales.  Because this structure precludes a potential reverse causality explanation, we 
can explore a causal relationship between advertising/sales, and systematic risk and 
R&D/sales and systematic risk (Boulding and Staelin 1995).  We include dummies for 
each moving window to account for any differences across windows.   
We checked for first-order serial correlation in errors, as Woolridge (2002) 
proposes.  This test rejected the hypothesis that there is no first-order serial correlation (p 
< 0.01), in support of the inclusion of an autoregressive (AR1) disturbance term.  We 
report the results of the estimation of the proposed model in Column 1 of Table 2.  
The proposed model is statistically significant (F (671, 2527) = 17.90, p < 0.01), 
and the R-square (within) for the proposed model is 0.161.  The rejection of the 
hypothesis of null fixed effects (F-value significant at p < 0.01) reinforces the need for 
fixed-effects correction.  The estimated autocorrelation coefficient, ρ is large at 0.668, 
and the Durbin-Watson statistic (Baltagi and Wu 1999) is not significant (t = 1.200, n.s.), 
reconfirming the need to adjust for serial correlation in errors.  
We first compare the coefficients of the accounting variables in this study with 
the results obtained by BKS (1970).  We note that BKS report significant effects for 
                                                                                                                                                 
autoregression has withstood the test of time and experimentation as a reasonable model for underlying 
processes that probably, in truth, are impenetrably complex.” 
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dividend payout (b = -0.58, p < 0.01), growth (b = 0.84, p < 0.05), and earnings 
variability (b = 3.03, p < 0.01).  In our results, significant coefficients indicated that 
growth (b = 0.359, p < 0.01) and leverage (b = 0.515, p < 0.01) are positively associated 
with a firm’s systematic risk, whereas asset size (b= -0.091, p < 0.01) is negatively 
associated with systematic risk.  Given the changes in stock market regimes over time 
and the refinements in the estimation procedure we use in this paper (i.e. we use a panel 
data model, incorporating fixed effects and serial correlation in errors), the differences in 
this study’s coefficients relative to those that BKS (1970) report are not surprising.8  We 
infer that differences among our findings, those in the BKS, and those of BKS’s model 
approach using the 1980-1999 data reported in footnote 8 arise because of differences (1) 
in stock market regimes across the years arising from changes in the range of predictor 
variables, and (2) in econometric estimation procedure across our study and the BKS 
                                                 
8 We also estimated the model estimated by BKS for the twenty years in this study by constructing two data 
sets: one for period 1980-1989 and another data set for the period 1990-1999 by averaging the various 
accounting variables for the ten years following the procedure in the BKS paper.  
The results of the ordinary least squares regression for the model with accounting variables were significant 
in both ten year periods: period 1: F(6, 338)=22.501, p < 0.01; period 2: F(6, 231)=17.742, p < 0.01; with 
the following R-squares: period 1: R-sq: 0.285; period 2: R-sq: 0.315).  The following accounting variables 
were significant: period 1: growth (+ and p < 0.01), leverage (+ and p < 0.05), earnings variability (+ and p 
< 0.01) and asset size (- and p < 0.01); period 2: growth (+ and p < 0.10), leverage (+ and p < 0.05), 
earnings variability (+ and p < 0.01), and asset size (- and p < 0.01).  
From the above we can see the impact of methodology.  BKS, with their data and methodology, found 
growth, earnings variability, and dividend payout significantly associated with beta but asset size and 
leverage were not associated with beta.  Considering the question of why BKS did not identify asset size 
and leverage as predictors of beta, recall that BKS eliminated leverage and asset size in a stepwise 
regression of data averaged over ten years.  We conjecture that panel-structure-adjusted correlations may 
have shown that leverage and asset size were then (as they are now) good predictors of systematic risk.  
The raw correlation structure in our panel data is consistent with this conjecture.  Correlations of liquidity, 
in the panel data set, with both asset size (ρ = .34) and leverage (ρ = -.37) are high.  In summary, we 
suggest that the difference between our results and BKS’s results are, in large part, driven by an up-to-date 
econometric estimation approach in this paper.  After correcting for methodology, the remaining 
differences in our findings might be due to change in the marketplace—or they might be due to the fact that 
BKS’s use of stepwise regression artificially eliminated leverage and asset size that our proposed model 
(with its panel structure) identifies as important predictors of beta. 
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study—we incorporate information on the panel data structure in the estimation, whereas 
the BKS study do not.  
With respect to the other control variables, the firm’s age (b = -0.022, p < 0.01) 
and competitive intensity (b = -0.885, p < 0.01) are significantly associated with lower 
systematic risk.  The accounting variables of liquidity (b = 0.001, n.s.), earnings 
variability (b = -0.018, n.s.), and dividend payout (b = 0.000, n.s.) are not related to 
systematic risk.  
We next discuss the two hypothesized effects.  The results indicate that, as 
expected in H1 and H2 respectively, higher lagged advertising/sales (b = -3.187, p < 
0.01) and higher lagged R&D/sales (b = -0.501, p < 0.01) lower the firm’s systematic risk.  
Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-estimated the proposed model 
including the square of lagged advertising/sales and the square of lagged R&D/sales to 
explore non-linear effects.  The results were similar to those reported in Column 1 of 
Table 2 with no significant effect for the squared terms.  We discuss this finding in detail 
in the discussion section.  We also re-estimated the model using the interaction effect of 
lagged advertising and lagged R&D, but find no support for this interaction effect.  
Thus, the estimation results strongly support H1 and H2, indicating that after 
controlling for factors that accounting researchers have shown to affect the firm’s 
systematic risk, increases in both advertising/sales and R&D/sales lower a firm’s 
systematic risk.  We next report the results of additional analyses that examine the 
robustness of the results. 
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Additional Analyses  
 
Explanatory Power of Proposed Model.  We compared the performance of the 
proposed model, which includes lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales, with a 
baseline model that only includes the accounting measures of growth, leverage, liquidity, 
asset size, dividend payout, and earnings variability, and the two additional control 
variables of age and competitive intensity (results not reported here).  The model with 
lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales outperforms the baseline model based on 
the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) (lower number indicates superior fit): 
SBC (proposed model) = 3705.873 versus SBC (baseline model) = 3741.607.  The 
direction and significance level of the coefficients of the BKS variables in this baseline 
model without lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales are unchanged confirming 
that there is no evidence of multicollinearity of lagged advertising/sales and lagged 
R&D/sales with the control variables.  
Alternative Estimates of Systematic Risk.  The proposed model reported in 
Column 1 of Table 2 uses equal-weighted market returns to estimate the firm’s 
systematic risk, β.  To examine the robustness of the proposed model’s results to 
alternative specifications for systematic risk, we also estimated beta for the five-year 
moving window using the value-weighted market returns and obtain generally consistent 
results for the effects of advertising/sales and R&D/sales on the firm’s systematic risk 
with value-weighted beta estimates (Column 2 of Table 2).   
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  To examine the robustness of the negative effects of advertising/sales and 
R&D/sales on beta, we expanded the data to include firms for which only 50 of the 60 
months of stock returns in a moving window were available for estimating beta.  
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 contain the results of model estimation using equal-weighted 
and value-weighted measures of market return in the estimation of beta for the expanded 
sample that includes observations with 50 or more months of stock returns for the 60-
month moving window.  The effects of advertising/sales and R&D/sales on systematic 
risk using the larger data set of firms with as few as 50 months of stock returns are 
similar to those obtained using the smaller data set which includes firms for which all 60 
months of stock returns are available to estimate beta. 
Changes Regression.  Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we 
explored the robustness of the results using a changes regression (Boulding and Staelin 
1995).  We first created the difference value for a variable, as the difference between the 
variable at time t and at time t-1.  The correlation matrix of the differenced variables 
suggested potential multicollinearity problems, especially between “change in advertising 
scaled by sales” and “change in R&D scaled to sales,” which perhaps is not surprising 
because increases in R&D are likely to be associated with increases in advertising.  To 
reduce the impact of this multicollinearity, we orthogonalized predictor variables using 
factor analysis.  Varimax rotation ensured that each factor had one and only one predictor 
variable loading heavily on that factor (variables’ loadings on their respective factors 
exceeded 0.98).  We report the results of the changes regression models using difference 
scores for beta, which we estimated with 60 months of equal-weighted returns using both 
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raw predictor variables and factor-score predictor variables in Column 5 and 6 of Table 2.  
The results of this estimation indicate that a reasonable model fit and that increases in a 
firm’s lagged advertising/sales and increases in lagged R&D/sales reduce the firm’s 
systematic risk, in support of H1 and H2.9 
Reverse Causality.  As we have noted, the model we estimated considered the 
impact of the firm’s advertising/sales in period t-1 and R&D/sales in period t-1 on 
systematic risk, β in period t to rule out reverse causation.  However, it is possible that 
either because of inertia (i.e., advertising budgets and R&D budgets are set as a 
percentage of sales) or because managers are forward looking, advertising and R&D 
budgets in period t-1 may be related to period t’s firm characteristics, particularly, 
systematic risk.  
To rule out reverse causality, we performed the Granger-Causality Wald Tests 
(Dekimpe and Hanssens 2000; Granger 1969).  Specifically, we performed Granger-
causality Wald tests for each time series in the data set using a bivariate approach 
(Leeflang and Wittink 1992) between 1) the firm’s systematic risk and its 
advertising/sales and 2) the firm’s systematic risk and its R&D/sales.  The results of the 
Wald tests indicated that a firm’s systematic risk did not “Granger cause” either 
advertising or R&D, empirically ruling out the reverse causality explanation. 
 In addition, we performed two regressions to rule out potential reverse causality 
explanations.  First, we regressed advertising/sales in time period t as a function of all 
                                                 
9 We obtain generally similar results for the models using beta computed using value-weighted market 
returns. 
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predictor variables in the proposed model and beta in time period t-1.  Second, we 
regressed R&D/sales in time period t, as a function of all predictor variables in the 
proposed model and beta in time period t-1.  Both models included fixed effects, an auto 
correlation error term, and window dummies.  The results of the regressions (not reported 
here) indicated that, consistent with the lack of reverse causality established above, beta 
in time period t-1 does not affect either advertising/sales or R&D/sales in time period t.  
Potential Endogeneity of Advertising and R&D.  Following the explanation that 
a firm’s managers may be forward looking, we also seek to rule out potential endogeneity 
explanations of the firm’s advertising/sales and R&D/sales.  First, we note that our fixed-
effects formulation already rules out endogeneity that might be caused by omitted 
variables.  Second, following Boulding and Staelin (1995), we check for endogeneity of 
lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales using an instrumental variable estimation 
procedure.  
We use the firm’s advertising/sales and R&D/sales in time period t-2 as the 
instrument for the firm’s advertising/sales and R&D/sales in time period t-1 and re-
estimate the model relating a firm’s 2-period-lagged advertising/sales and R&D/sales to 
its systematic risk.  The results of this instrumental variable estimation procedure (not 
reported here) are consistent with those obtained with the one-period-lagged predictor 
variables of advertising/sales and R&D/sales reported for the proposed model in Column 
1 of Table 2.  Following the instrumental variable estimation, we also performed the 
Davidson-MacKinnon test (Woolridge 2002; pp. 118-122) of endogeneity for lagged 
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advertising and lagged R&D and find no support for endogeneity of either advertising or 
R&D. 
Alternative Measures of Advertising and R&D.  In the results discussed thus far, 
we scaled both the firm’s advertising and R&D expenditures by its sales.  Following the 
suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-estimated the model with measures of the 
firm’s advertising and R&D scaled by its assets.  The results (not reported here) using a 
model identical to the model reported in Column 1 of Table 2 with advertising/sales and 
R&D/sales replaced by the advertising/assets and R&D/assets respectively indicate a 
reasonable model fit (F significant at p < 0.01).  The directionality of the parameter 
estimates of the predictor variables are consistent with those reported in Column 1 of 
Table 2 although the significance level changes to p < 0.05; advertising/assets (b = -0.737, 
p < 0.05) and R&D/assets (b = -1.024, p < 0.05) lower the firm’s systematic risk.  
Alternative Measure of Earnings Variability.  In addition, following the 
suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we re-estimated the model using cash flow 
variability as a control variable instead of earnings variability used by BKS.  Again, the 
results (not reported here) indicated a reasonable model fit (F significant at p < 0.01) with 
consistent results for the effects of both advertising/sales (b = -3.509, p < 0.01) and 
R&D/sales (b = -0.443, p < 0.05) on systematic risk.  
Thus, the results are robust to alternative model specifications, including the 
regression of differenced variables; alternative measures of systematic risk, including 
equal-weighted or value-weighted market returns and 60 months or 50 months of returns; 
alternative measures of advertising and R&D scaled by firm’s sales or assets; and 
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earnings variability or cash flow variability.  We also empirically rule out reverse 
causality (i.e., systematic risk lowers advertising and R&D) and endogeneity of both 
advertising and R&D expenditures.  In summary, the additional analyses strengthen our 
confidence in our key findings that both lagged advertising/sales and lagged R&D/sales 
lower a firm’s systematic risk.  
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
The accountability of marketing initiatives, especially as measured by metrics of 
interest to a firm’s shareholders, is under increasing scrutiny from senior management 
and finance executives who control marketing budgets.  Not surprisingly, marketing 
scholars have turned their attention to relationships between various aspects of a firm’s 
marketing strategy and shareholder value producing a wealth of insights that indicate an 
important role for marketing in shareholder wealth creation.  However, there are few 
insights relating a firm’s marketing initiatives to its systematic risk, an important metric 
of risk for publicly listed firms.  In this paper, we examine the impact of a firm’s 
advertising and R&D, two important manifestations of a firm’s marketing strategy on its 
systematic risk.  We conclude with a discussion of the paper’s findings, theoretical 
contributions, managerial implications, limitations, and opportunities for further research.  
 
Theoretical Implications  
 
To our knowledge, this is the first empirical study covering a broad multi-industry 
sample of firms over a 22-year period to demonstrate that, after controlling for those 
accounting and finance factors related to systematic risk, increases in advertising/sales 
and R&D/sales lower a firm’s systematic risk.  The negative relationship between a 
firm’s advertising expenditure and its systematic risk (shown by Singh et al. (2005) in a 
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limited empirical context and by Madden et al. (2006) without controlling for accounting 
and finance factors and firms specific effects) holds up for all firms across a long time 
that extends from 1979 to 2001.  By focusing on the firm’s systematic risk, an important 
metric of considerable interest to senior executives of publicly listed firms, we address 
the several calls for marketing scholars and practitioners to speak in the language of 
finance (Rust et al. 2004; Srivastava et al. 1998).   
The finding of a non-significant effect of the quadratic term for a firm’s 
advertising/sales and R&D/sales on its systematic risk is interesting and merits discussion.  
We offer two possible explanations for this phenomenon.  First, perhaps there are 
diminishing returns to increased advertising/sales (and R&D/sales) for some range of 
advertising/sales (and R&D/sales) values, but that advertising/sales (and R&D/sales) 
values have been constrained well below that optimum, in a range for which that 
relationship is linear.  Such a situation may occur, if firms are wise enough to set 
advertising/sales (and R&D/sales) for optimal financial returns, and if that optimal 
financial return level is lower than that required to deliver the lowest beta.  Alternatively, 
the linear effect of advertising/sales may occur because a firm’s senior management and 
finance executives lack the tools to evaluate the potential impact and thus set 
advertising/sales below levels that yield the lowest systematic risk.  A second possible 
explanation for our inability to detect a quadratic effect when there are diminishing 
returns to increases in advertising/sales is heterogeneity across firms, industries, and/or 
time in the relationship between advertising/sales and beta.  As finance and accounting 
researchers have done previously, in interest of generality, we estimate our model with 
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the broadest possible cross-section of firms and industries and for an extended period, 
which lends confidence to the study’s findings.  Future research, which explores firm, 
industry, and/or time specific effects that moderate the effects of advertising on its 
systematic risk may uncover firms, industries, or periods for which such diminishing 
returns may be identifiable.  
In a departure from most prior studies on systematic risk, β, which have used a 
silo-based approach (i.e., using only accounting and financial measures), we include 
accounting, financial, and marketing variables (in this case, advertising and R&D) in our 
model of systematic risk.  The negative impact of advertising/sales and R&D/sales on 
systematic risk in our model that also includes financial variables suggests potential 
interchangeability between the firm’s marketing and financial choice variables in 
managing its systematic risk.  Future research that examines other such interchangeable 
effects of other aspects of firms’ marketing and financial strategies on metrics of interest 
to capital markets (e.g. cost of capital, intangible value, stock returns) would be valuable 
to senior marketing executives who are often under pressure from their senior 
management teams to justify investments in their advertising and R&D programs.  
This study’s finding that a firm’s advertising/sales and R&D/sales lowers its 
systematic risk, combined with results from other studies (Mizik and Jacobson 2003; 
Madden et al. 2006) that show that a firm’s advertising increases its stock return, leads to 
an interesting conjecture.  Consistent with the notion that advertising and R&D increase a 
firm’s stock returns, a post hoc analysis indicated that lagged advertising/sales and lagged 
R&D/sales were highly correlated with the firm’s intangible value (ρ(advertising/sales, 
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Tobin’s Q)= 0.013, p < 0.01); ρ (R&D/sales, Tobin’s Q) = 0.283, p < 0.01).  Specifically, 
we conjecture that the risk-lowering and return-enhancing effects of advertising and 
R&D may contribute to the anomaly that Fama and French (1992) identify.  Although the 
capital asset pricing model assumes that firms with higher systematic risk can expect 
higher future returns, Fama and French find that there is no relationship between a firm’s 
risk in one period and its return in the future.  If it is the case that those firms who invest 
in advertising and R&D have been able to raise their returns while lowering their risk, 
then one might expect no empirical evidence of the “high risk leads to high return” link.  
Such an effect would be consistent with the finding in the finance literature that investors 
prefer highly advertised firms (Grullon et al. 2004) and the finding in the marketing 
literature that advertising has a direct impact on stock price beyond its indirect effect 
through increased sales (Joshi and Hanssens 2004).  Empirical research that explores this 
issue further would be valuable and would contribute to both the marketing and the 
finance literature. 
  
Managerial Implications 
 
The study’s findings also generate useful implications for managerial practice.  
Given the increasing calls for accountability of marketing initiatives, this paper’s findings 
that a firm’s higher advertising/sales and R&D/sales lower its systematic risk are novel 
and useful.  Marketing executives can use these findings to stress the multi-faceted role 
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of strong advertising and R&D programs, beyond their effects on market (e.g., sales, 
market shares) and financial (e.g. return on assets, cash flow) performance outcomes. 
Given the dual benefits of advertising and R&D for firm value through effects on 
both stock returns (Mizik and Jacobson 2003) and systematic risk, firms must be cautious 
in cutting back on their advertising and R&D programs.  A reduction in a firm’s 
advertising or R&D can have a double negative effect, not only reducing its financial 
performance, attendant cash flows, and stock returns, but also increasing its systematic 
risk, cost of capital, and discount rate.  
We believe the study’s findings may surprise senior management and finance 
executives, some of whom may view their firm’s advertising programs and R&D 
programs as discretionary activities.  Indeed, we believe that marketing executives can 
raise potentially provocative questions about whether extant allocation norms for 
advertising and R&D (e.g., as a fixed percentage of sales) still apply.  Could marketing 
executives rightfully argue that some proportion of the firm’s advertising and R&D 
budgets be considered a financial expenditure aimed at lowering its interest burden?  
Although we are mindful about this paper’s limited influence in changing 
established finance managers’ mind-sets about the uncertain returns to their firms’ 
advertising and R&D investments, we hope that this paper serves as an impetus for an 
ongoing dialog among senior management, finance executives, and marketing executives 
about the important ‘financial’ role of their firms’ advertising and R&D expenditures 
(Rust et al. 2004).  
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Indeed, the study’s specific findings can guide marketing executives to initiate a 
dialogue with their finance counterparts.  For example, what are their firm’s historical 
levels of advertising/sales, R&D/sales, and systematic risk, both independently and 
compared to those of other firms in the industry?  What are the implications of 
advertising and R&D budgets going forward, not only on the firm’s marketing objectives 
(e.g., sales, and market share) and financial objectives, (e.g., cash flows, return on assets) 
but also on its systematic risk?  We anticipate that the answers to these and related 
questions could guide the development of benchmarks to assess the returns to advertising 
and R&D programs.  Such ongoing dialogues may be very instructive to senior 
management and finance executives who control advertising and R&D budgets but are 
skeptical about the financial accountability of returns to these investments.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Given data availability constraints for publicly listed firms, in this study, we 
focused on the relationship between a firm’s systematic risk and advertising and R&D, 
two important indicators of the firm’s emphasis on differentiation and, therefore, of its 
marketing strategy.  Theoretical research using complementary methods (e.g., in-depth 
interviews, surveys, field studies) to develop a conceptual model and propositional 
inventories relating other elements of marketing strategy (e.g., marketing channels) to 
systematic risk will be useful in setting a research agenda for further empirical research. 
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Furtheremore, we measured the firm’s advertising and R&D using their 
aggregated, annual dollar amounts scaled by the firm’s sales.  Although advertising and 
R&D expenditures are important, especially from the perspective of senior management 
and finance executives, they represent consolidated input measures, which do not account 
for differences in implementation of advertising (e.g., creativity of advertising 
campaigns, efficiency of media planning) and new product development programs (e.g., 
intellectual property rights, new product success rates, entry timing).  Disaggregated 
measures of a firm’s advertising and R&D programs for all publicly listed firms are not 
available.  Further research that focuses on a few industry contexts and uses 
disaggregated measures of the various elements of advertising programs and new product 
development programs, including aspects of the programs’ effectiveness, could provide a 
useful extension to generate actionable managerial implications regarding the effects of 
various elements of a firm’s advertising and new product development program on its 
systematic risk.  
In summary, we view this study as an important first step in establishing that 
advertising and R&D lower systematic risk of the firm’s stock.  We hope that the study’s 
findings stimulate further work in this area. 
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ESSAY 2: A FUNDAMENTAL SIGNAL FROM ADVERTISING: ANALYST 
UNDER-REACTION 
 
CHAPTER 7: INTRODUCTION 
 
The market-based assets theory indicates that marketing expenditures and 
resulting marketing intangibles (e.g., brand equity) enhance firm value by increasing 
future cash flows and reducing the financial risk of a firm (Srivastava et al. 1998, 1999).  
Previous empirical studies have revealed significant links between marketing expenditure, 
brand equity, and stock returns (Hirschey and Weygandt 1985; Chauvin and Hirschey 
1993; Barth et al. 1998; Graham and Frankenberger 2000; Aaker and Jacobson 2001; 
Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Pauwels et al. 2004; Srinivasan et al. 2006, working paper; 
Joshi and Hanssens 2005, working paper; McAlister et al. 2007).  An important 
motivation behind those studies comes from the observation that senior management does 
not pay enough attention to marketing numbers, and it may even be the case that financial 
experts ignore the impact of marketing on firm value (Ambler 2000, 2003).  While the 
fact that marketing impacts firm value has been empirically shown, the notion that 
marketing is ignored by top management and financial experts comes from ad hoc 
surveys and anecdotal evidence (Ambler 2003; IPA report 2005; Quelch and McGovern 
2006).  There has been no empirical study of the impact of marketing numbers that 
considers both the reaction of the financial experts and the reaction of capital markets.  In 
this paper we do just that.   
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We propose a “fundamental signal from advertising,” an accounting-based 
advertising signal that stock market participants might perceive as a driver of firm value. 
We structure the advertising signal in a way that is consistent with the structure of 
measures that financial analysts are reported to use and that investors are advised to use 
in the analysis of financial statements (Lev and Thiagarajan 1993).  We examine the 
market’s and financial analysts’ responses to the proposed advertising signal to determine 
whether the market reacts to this advertising signal and whether financial analysts 
appreciate and incorporate this signal in their earnings10 forecasts.  Based on this 
empirical test, we offer the proposed advertising signal as a marketing metric, which 
should be of interest to senior management and to financial analysts.   
 This paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we propose a fundamental 
signal from advertising and introduce our measures of “market reaction” and “financial 
analysts’ reaction” typically used in the finance and accounting literature.  We develop 
hypotheses regarding the impact, or lack thereof, of the proposed signal on “market 
reaction” and “analysts’ reactions.”  We describe the method used to test the hypotheses 
and provide the empirical results.  We conclude with a discussion of the implications of 
this work for managers and for researchers. 
        
                                                 
10 Throughout the paper, ‘earnings’ means earnings per share, which is net income (after tax) minus 
dividends paid, divided by the number of shares outstanding. 
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A Fundamental Signal from Advertising (SADV) 
 
Fundamental analysis is a method of security valuation that involves examining a 
firm’s sales, earnings, growth potential, assets, expenses, etc. (investorwords.com).  
Fundamental analysis is an important and basic tool that investors use to assess a firm’s 
financial health as they look for under- and over- valued stocks.  After reviewing 
analysts’ reports and commentaries on financial statements in the context of such analysis, 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) constructed a set of measures to reflect those financial 
situations that seemed to cause analysts to change their forecasts of a firm’s future 
earnings.  They called the constructed predictor variables “fundamental signals” and 
tested whether the impact of these fundamental signals were associated with stock returns.  
In other words, they examined whether these signals were value-relevant, that is, whether 
the accounting numbers have a significant impact on stock market values (Holthausen 
and Watts 2001).     
Specifically, Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) proposed that an accounting predictor 
variable, X, be included in a form related to ∆X, where ∆X is defined as XXX /)( − , 
where X  is the average of the previous two years’ observations of X.  The precise form 
for the fundamental signal based on accounting number X is ∆X - ∆Sales.  A positive 
value for one of Lev and Thiagarajan’s (1993) fundamental signals (i.e., fundamental 
signals related to inventory, accounts receivable, gross margin, or SG&A) suggests 
potential problems at the firm, lowering expected firm value and hence lowering 
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analysts’ forecasts for future earnings.11  Several accounting studies have demonstrated 
that these fundamental signals are significantly related to firm value (Abarbanell and 
Bushee 1997, 1998; Amir, Lev, and Sougiannis 2003; Covrig and Low 2005) after 
accounting for reported earnings.  The findings have been interpreted to indicate that, in 
establishing firm value, the stock market goes beyond consideration of reported earnings 
to use these fundamental signals to assess the “quality of the earnings.”   
Perhaps surprisingly, none of these studies included a fundamental signal related 
to “advertising.”12  The closest these models typically come to including advertising as a 
force that shapes firm value is to include SG&A (which includes advertising) as a 
shaping force. 
In this study, we introduce a fundamental signal related to advertising (SADV), 
which is measured as ∆Sales - ∆Advertising.  When this quantity is positive, sales are 
increasing faster than advertising; when negative, sales are increasing slower than 
advertising.  We suggest SADV as a signal which the stock market recognizes as an 
important value driver while financial analysts might depreciate in their earnings 
forecasts.  We discuss why the two parties’ amount of attention to SADV can be different 
in the ‘hypotheses’ section.    
Structure of Fundamental Signals.  Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) give the 
fundamental signals their specific functional form because they need the signals to 
represent the unexpected change in the underlying variables.  The need to use unexpected 
                                                 
11 The structure for the fundamental signal of gross margin (GM) is ∆Sales - ∆GM.  
12 In this paper, we define “advertising” as publicly reported “Advertising Expense,” DATA45 in 
COMPUSTAT, which includes the cost of advertising media (radio, television, newspapers, and 
periodicals) and promotion expenses, but excludes selling and other marketing expenses. (COMPUSTAT 
User’s Guide) 
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change arises from the efficient market hypothesis, which underlies virtually all capital 
market research in finance and accounting (Kothari 2001; Lee 2001).  That hypothesis 
holds that a firm’s current stock price reflects the market’s expectations about all future 
cash flows for that firm.  Given this hypothesis, revelation of any information that is 
consistent with the market’s current expectations will have no impact on a firm’s stock 
price.  It is only the revelation of information that is inconsistent with current 
expectations that will change a firm’s stock price.   
Thus, the efficient market hypothesis holds that a firm’s current stock price 
reflects the market’s beliefs about the values that accounting variables will take in all 
future periods.  When one of those accounting variables takes on an unexpected value, 
stock price changes.  The written pronouncements of analysts (e.g., Quality of Earnings 
Report on Harris Corporation 1989) referenced by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) reveal that 
analysts expect several accounting variables (inventory, accounts receivable, gross 
margin, and SG&A) to change at the same rate as sales (i.e., analysts expect the percent 
change in an accounting predictor variable, ∆X, to be equal to the percentage change in 
sales, ∆Sales).  Only a disproportionate (to sales) percentage change in X will surprise 
analysts and, consequently, change those analysts’ forecasts.  Hence, Lev and 
Thiagarajan (1993) define ∆X - ∆Sales to be a fundamental signal.  In this paper, we use 
this structure identified by Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) for the fundamental signals of 
accounting predictor variables (i.e., fundamental signals of inventory, accounts receivable, 
gross margin, and SG&A) and for the proposed fundamental signal from advertising, 
SADV.  
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Firm Value and Analysts’ Expectation of Firm Value.  Following the tradition 
in accounting and finance, we represent firm value by CAR (cumulative abnormal stock 
returns) calculated with monthly stock returns reported by CRSP (Center for Research in 
Security Prices), we represent analysts’ forecasts of firm value by PVE, the present value 
of consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings for five years into the future from I/B/E/S 
(Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System).   
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CHAPTER 8: HYPOTHESES 
 
Is SADV Value-Relevant?  
 
For the construct of SADV, we use advertising expenditures and sales aggregated 
over a year and across markets that the firm has served.  Implicit in accountants’ model 
of fundamental signals is our assumption that accounting variables (like inventory, 
accounts receivable, etc.) scale with sales.  That is, an accounting variable is assumed to 
change at the same rate that sales change.  Translating this logic to the accounting 
measure “advertising,” the percentage change of sales (∆Sales) is the expected percentage 
change of advertising (∆Advertising).   
In particular, given that ∆Advertising is positive, a positive SADV (∆Sales > 
∆Advertising > 0) may occur either (1) when the firm managed their firm-level 
advertising expenditures effectively or (2) when growth potential for a market tapped by 
the firm looms larger than expected, or both.  When ∆Advertising is negative, a positive 
SADV (∆Sales > ∆Advertising, and ∆Advertising < 0) occurs when sales fall at a slower 
rate than advertising.  In that case, a positive SADV is consistent with the firm’s 
accumulated brand equity causing sales to fall at a slower rate than advertising.  
Presumably stock investors interpret a positive SADV in these ways.  With the two possible 
presumptions, we hypothesize that a positive SADV is related to stock returns positively. 
First, a temporal improvement of advertising effectiveness, as the underlying 
cause of a positive SADV, has been shown to be associated with stock prices theoretically 
 46 
and empirically.  The resource-based view of the firm posits that improvement in a firm’s 
capability to translate marketing inputs (such as advertising) into outputs will lead to 
higher firm value (Wernerfelt 1984; Dutta et al. 1999).  Empirically, prior marketing 
studies have shown that a firm’s marketing capabilities are associated with firm value 
(Dutta et al. 1999; Mittal et al. 2005; Luo and Donthu 2006).  Dutta et al. (1999) 
measured marketing, R&D, and operational capabilities of a firm using stochastic frontier 
estimation model (SFE) and found that their measure of marketing capability was 
significantly associated with firms’ profits and Tobin’s Qs.  Mittal et al. (2005) measured 
a firm’s marketing inefficiency in creating consumer satisfaction using data envelope 
analysis (DEA) and found that a dual emphasis on marketing efficiency and the level of 
marketing expenditure led to higher firm value.  Luo and Donthu (2006) measured 
marketing communication productivity (MCP) by applying DEA and found that MCP 
had an inverted-U relationship with Tobin’s Q and stock return.   
These findings, which link measures of marketing effectiveness (or marketing 
communication effectiveness) and firm value, are intriguing.  Unfortunately, measures 
estimated with SFE and DEA are not easily accessible to most investors, suggesting the 
importance of finding a signal of advertising effectiveness that is readily available.  Since 
SADV has been structured to be easily accessible to market participants, we expect that 
SADV, as a measure of advertising effectiveness, is positively associated with firm value. 
Second, another potential cause of a positive SADV is a strong upward spike in 
aggregated sales at the year when SADV is measured.  In this case, the stock market might 
construe a positive SADV as a signal for either the firm’s successful entry into untouched 
 47 
markets or sales takeoff of the firm’s innovative products.  In both scenarios, the stock 
market is likely to consider a positive SADV as the value relevant information.   
Therefore, although more information is required to figure out the main 
determinant of a firm’s SADV, based on the aforementioned presumptions about stock 
market’s interpretations of a positive SADV, we hypothesize that a positive SADV is 
positively related to CAR. 
H1: Higher levels of SADV are associated with higher levels of the annual 
cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR). 
 
Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts and their Inefficiency   
 
It is generally accepted that analysts’ earnings forecasts provide an important 
input to stock market participants (Loh and Mian 2003; Cheng 2005).  This link between 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and market reactions has been well-established (e.g., Abdel-
khalik 1982; Brown, Foster, and Noreen 1985).  Accordingly, models of stock return 
include analysts’ earnings forecasts as a predictor variable (Cheng 2005).  However, 
accounting studies have shown that analysts’ forecasts do not fully incorporate all 
information to which the market reacts (e.g., Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Abarbanell 
and Bushee 1997; Kim et al. 2001; Amir et al. 2003; Cheng 2005).  In particular, findings 
reveal that analysts are inefficient in their incorporation of the fundamentals signals, and 
that this inefficiency results in forecast errors.  These studies implicitly warn investors to 
be cautious when using analysts’ reports and suggest that investors may benefit from 
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performing their own analyses of financial statements even when analysts’ reports are 
available.  
Intangibles and Error/Dispersion in Analysts’ Forecasts.  Although there is no 
published evidence that the level of consensus analysts’ forecasts is impacted by 
advertising, some literature has considered the possibility that the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts may be impacted by advertising or other marketing-related measures.   
Taking SG&A as a proxy for marketing, Kwon (2002) asked whether SG&A 
(scaled by sales) and/or R&D (scaled by assets) affect forecast dispersion for low-tech 
firms and for high-tech firms.  The study showed that only R&D significantly increased 
forecast dispersion and that those effects held only for the sample of high-tech firms.  
Kwon (2002) interpreted the finding as suggesting a noise effect for intangibles: Higher 
intangibles created by R&D make future earnings of high-tech firms less predictable.  
Barron et al. (2002) showed that both advertising and R&D (each scaled by total 
operating expense) increased the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts in a much broader 
sample that included 1,103 firm-year observations across industries.  They argue that 
analysts who believe that advertising and R&D create an asset will seek private 
information in order to assess the value of that asset.  If these analysts tap different 
information sources, they might arrive at different forecasts, hence increasing forecast 
dispersion.   
On the other hand, Srinivasan (2007, working paper) hypothesized that higher 
levels of advertising and R&D (each scaled by sales) will lower forecast dispersion 
because higher advertising and R&D will increase analysts’ attention.  This study found 
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that, for successful firms (Fortune 300), higher levels of advertising spending and/or 
R&D spending are, in fact, associated with lower forecast dispersion.   
Given the conflicting results, further research is warranted.  However, the 
question of whether advertising increases or decreases forecast dispersion is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  In this paper, we are concerned with the impact of advertising on the 
level of consensus analysts’ forecasts.   
 
Is SADV Incorporated in Analysts’ Future Earnings Forecasts? 
 
Accounting can be viewed as a “language” that may predispose users of financial 
information to a given model of perception and behavior (Belkaoui 1978, 1980).  
Literature that takes this perspective considers a financial statement user’s “vocabulary” 
to be the set of accounting numbers13 that the user has learned to employ in his/her 
analysis of a firm’s financial performance.  This literature suggests that an analyst who 
works with and understands the accounting vocabulary associated with a particular 
industry will more accurately value firms in that industry.  This “accounting vocabulary” 
is analogous to the “consumption vocabulary” in the consumer behavior literature, which 
is hypothesized to govern the quality of a consumer’s evaluation of choice alternatives 
(West, Brown, and Hoch 1996).  As a consumer’s vocabulary “grows” (i.e., as the 
consumer develops an understanding of additional variables important in the evaluation 
of choice alternatives), that consumer’s evaluations become more accurate.  From these 
                                                 
13 Accounting numbers should be understood to include specific numbers from financial reports and 
functions (such as ratios) of those numbers. 
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two literatures, we infer that analysts who have not developed an understanding of the 
ways in which advertising enhances firm value (i.e., analysts who do not have the 
advertising-firm value link in their vocabularies) will be unlikely to pick up on 
advertising’s value-enhancing impact on firm value.   
To consider the advertising-firm value vocabulary analysts are taught during their 
business school training, we examined 11 Corporate Finance, Security Valuation, and 
Financial Statement Analysis textbooks published between 1986 and 2007.14  Specifically, 
we scanned these texts for discussion of the link between advertising and firm value.  
While most of these text books discuss no specific link between advertising and firm 
value, most do link SG&A (which includes advertising) to firm value.  In every case, 
these links are assumed to be negative—higher SG&A expense is taken as a signal of 
inadequate cost control and is, therefore, expected to lower firm value.  Among the texts, 
only three of them (Hawkins 1986; Siegel 1991; Bernstein and Wild 2000) suggest that 
one go beyond the consideration of SG&A to investigate an independent impact for 
advertising.  These books also suggest that reducing advertising is not always positively 
related to firm value.  Siegel (1991) advocates reducing advertising only when the 
reduction is designed to eliminate waste or inefficiency.  Bernstein and Wild (2000) 
suggest that advertising has effects on firm value beyond the current period, hence 
reduction of advertising can harm future cash flows and hence firm value. 
                                                 
14 We reviewed the texts in corporate finance from Hawkins (1986), Rob (2007), Ross, Westerfield, Jaffe, 
and Jordan (2007), and texts in financial statement analysis from Foster (1986), Siegal (1991), Bernstein 
and Wild (2000).  We also reviewed practical textbooks specifically focusing on stock valuation (Cornell 
1993, Guatri 1994, Ferris and Petitt 2002, Hoover 2006, Stowe, Robinson, Pinto, and McLeavey 2007).   
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 In addition to finance and accounting textbooks’ relative silence regarding 
advertising’s role in creating firm value, surveys report that senior management does not 
regularly track or report marketing and/or advertising information to the board of 
directors (Ambler 2003; Quelch and McGovern 2006).  Consistent with the fact that 
analysts are not likely to have heard from textbooks or from senior management that 
advertising is a creator of firm value, an IPA survey of analysts (2005 UK) found that 
only 6 percent of surveyed analysts reported using publicly reported advertising spending 
when they construct their earnings forecasts.  Finally, recall that Lev and Thiagarajan’s 
(1993) study of analysts’ reports and commentaries found that advertising was not among 
the signals that analysts found important in determining firm value. 
 Beyond the fact that analysts are not likely to have learned that advertising is a 
creator of firm value and the fact that analysts do not report using advertising when they 
assess firm value, the literature shows that analysts do not even fully impound those 
accounting signals that they have been taught to use and that they do report using.  
Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) tested the effects of the Lev-and-Thiagarajan-identified 
fundamental accounting signals on analysts’ future earnings forecasts.  They found that, 
relative to the reaction to those signals by the capital market, financial analysts’ one-year-
ahead earnings forecasts reflected an under-reaction to fundamental signals.  Recently, 
Cheng (2005) confirmed that analysts under-react to, or ignore, some fundamental signals. 
In summary, finance and accounting textbooks we reviewed make almost no 
mention of the possibility that advertising might enhance firm value.  Typically, these 
texts leave students to draw inferences about the relationship between advertising and 
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firm value based on what is taught about the relationship between SG&A (which includes 
advertising) and firm value.  We conclude that the most likely inference to be drawn is 
that advertising is an expense to be controlled, not a creator of firm value.  Combining 
this with analyst’s silence about the relationship between advertising and firm value, and 
with the fact that analysts may not fully impound even those variables they do believe to 
be related to firm value, we should not expect that financial analysts will consider the 
impact of advertising when they predict future firm value: 
 H2: The level of SADV  is not related to analysts’ estimate of a firm’s value (PVE).  
 
If the market reacts to SADV (H1) but analysts do not (H2), we should expect the 
errors in analysts’ earnings forecasts to be related to SADV.  Our third hypothesis is, then: 
H3: The level of SADV is associated with the level of error in analysts’ next-year 
forecasts (FERR). 
 
As pointed out when we defined PVE, convention in the valuation literature leads 
us to calculate PVE over a five-year time window.  Convention in the forecast error 
literature, however, leads us to calculate forecast error using a one-year time window 
(e.g., Abarbanell and Bushee 1997).  That is, FERR is calculated as next year’s actual 
earnings minus the consensus analysts’ forecast for next year’s earnings.  (Perhaps a 
shorter time window is thought to provide a fairer test of analysts’ forecasting abilities.)  
To be sure that one-year relationships do not differ from the five-year relationships, we 
develop two sub-hypotheses related to H3.  We ask, in H3-a), whether SADV is related to 
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next year’s earnings as one would expect based on the logic supporting H1, and in H3-b), 
whether SADV is not related to next-year earnings forecasts as one would expect based on 
the logic supporting H2: 
H3-a): The level of SADV is associated with the level of next year’s actual earnings 
(AEPS). 
  
H3-b): The level of SADV is not associated with the level of analysts’ next-year 
earnings forecasts (FEPS).  
 
 54 
CHAPTER 9: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 
 
The primary purpose of our study is to examine the impact of a fundamental 
signal from advertising (SADV) on (1) analysts’ forecasts of firm value and on (2) firm 
value as revealed in the market.  Adapting Amir et al. (2003), we address the first of these 
research questions by modeling analysts’ forecasts as a function of SADV and traditional 
accounting and finance control and predictor variables.  We address the second research 
question by modeling firm value as a function of SADV and the same control and predictor 
variables.  In this section, we define the important variables used in the models to address 
our research questions.  
 
Firm Value: Annual Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns (CAR)   
 
Finance and accounting scholars often model a firm’s value in terms of the return 
that the firm’s stock provides to investors.  To understand the value of fundamental 
signals, accounting researchers ask whether the unexpected change in some predictor 
variable (reported in a fundamental signal) is associated with “abnormal returns,” which 
are actual minus expected returns (Lev and Thiagarajan 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee 
1997; Amir et al. 2003).  Because information flows into the market continuously, 
abnormal returns are typically calculated monthly and then summed across the months of 
a year to yield the stock’s “cumulative abnormal return,” or CAR. 
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Actual monthly return for a stock i in month t is 
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cash dividend payable on common stock i in month t, itP  is closing price of common 
stock i at end of month t, and 1−itP  is closing price at the end of month t-1, adjusted for 
capital changes such as stock splits and stock dividends.  For the expected return for a 
stock at the end of month t, we apply the three factor model of Fama and French (1993)15 
using 60 ex post historical monthly returns.  We use the predicted return ( itR ) from that 
model as the “expected return” (see Appendix F for the details).  Abnormal return ( itAR ) 
for stock i during month t becomes actual minus expected return (i.e., ititit RRAR −= ), 
and the stock’s CAR is the sum of the monthly abnormal stock returns ( itAR ) across the 
months of a year.16  In the rest of the paper, when we use the term “firm value,” we will 
be referring to CAR, the measure typically used by accounting and finance researchers in 
this context. 
   
Analysts’ Expectation of Firm Value: Present Value of Earnings Forecasts (PVE) 
 
Analysts are financial experts who estimate a firm’s future earnings and provide 
those estimates to the stock market.  Investors assess stock value on the basis of a firm’s 
expected future earnings, frequently referring to analysts’ estimates of those future 
                                                 
15 We also calculated expected stock returns using the traditional CAPM (Sharpe 1964) and found results 
consistent with the results from the three factor model that we present in this paper.  
16 Based on a suggestion by Dr. Clement, one of the committee members, I also calculated ‘firm value’ as 
the sum of monthly abnormal stock returns between a fiscal-year end and four months after the fiscal-year 
end and found results consistent with the results from the model using 12-month CAR. 
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earnings (for example, see Kothari 2002).  Thus, analysts’ earnings forecasts are 
important inputs to investment decisions and their consequence, stock returns (Schipper 
1991).   
A consensus analysts’ forecast is the average or median of earnings forecasts from 
all analysts covering a particular firm.  Since a stock’s price is the discounted sum of 
expected future cash flows, the discounted sum of five years of consensus earnings 
forecasts is a good proxy for financial analysts’ estimate of firm value (Frankel and Lee 
1998; Amir et al. 2003).  We will refer to this discounted sum of consensus earnings 
forecasts as the present value of future earnings forecasts, PVE. 17   
 
Traditional Accounting and Finance Control Variables in Models of Firm Value 
(CAR) and Analysts’ Forecasts (PVE)   
 
Accounting scholars studying the drivers of analysts’ forecasts and drivers of firm 
value have included several important control variables.  The most obvious of those 
controls for CAR and PVE is earnings per share (EPS).  The change in a firm’s effective 
tax rate (ETR) is another control for CAR and PVE presented in the literature (Lev and 
Thiagarajan 1993; Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Amir et al. 2003).  Finally, Amir et al. 
(2003) proposed one-year-lagged firm value (L_CAR) as a control for CAR.  Thus, we 
include EPS and ETR as control variables in our model of PVE, and we include EPS, 
ETR, and L_CAR as control variables in our model of CAR. 
                                                 
17 The details of how to measure PVE and all other important variables in this paper are presented in the 
Appendix D, E, and F. 
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“Fundamental Signals” Predictor Variables Identified by Lev and Thiagarajan 
(1993) 
  
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) introduced fundamental accounting signals 
(structured as described in the introduction) and showed that these fundamental signals 
were significant predictors of firm value (CAR).  Amir et al. (2003) found these 
fundamental signals to be significant predictors of analysts’ forecasts (PVE) in addition 
to being predictors of firm value.  Following this research tradition, we include Lev and 
Thiagarajan’s (1993) fundamental signals as predictor variables in our models of firm 
value and analysts’ forecasts.  Those fundamental signals are:  
SINV  = ∆INV - ∆Sales.  A positive value for this indicator (implying that a firm’s 
inventory is growing faster than its sales) is assumed to be a signal that the firm is having 
difficulty generating sales.   
 SAR  = ∆AR - ∆Sales.  A positive value for this indicator (implying that a firm’s 
accounts receivable are growing faster than its sales) is assumed to be a signal that the 
firm is having difficulty selling its products and must, therefore, extend its credit terms.   
  SGM  = ∆Sales - ∆GM.  A positive value for this indicator (implying that a firm’s 
sales are growing faster than its gross margin) is assumed to indicate inefficiency in 
operating cost controls.   
  SSG&A =∆SG&A - ∆Sales.  A positive value for this indicator (implying that the 
firm’s SG&A is growing faster than its sales) is assumed to imply a loss of managerial 
control over general expenses.   
 58 
A firm with a positive value for any of these fundamental signals is expected to be 
evaluated as less valuable by analysts and the market.  
 Relationship between SSG&A and SADV.   Our focal variable, SADV, is embedded in 
SSG&A since SG&A (DATA189) includes advertising expense (DATA45) according to the 
definition of the SG&A in the COMPUSTAT User’s Guide.  Defining Partial SG&A 
(PSG&A) as SG&A minus Advertising, we replace SSG&A with SADV and SPSG&A, where 
SPSG&A is the percentage change in partial SG&A minus the percentage change in sales.  
This breakup of SSG&A into SPSG&A and SADV could pose at least two problems for our 
models.  First, if advertising expense were the primary driver of variation in SG&A, then 
removal of advertising from SG&A might leave SPSG&A as a poor indicator of that loss of 
managerial control that Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) proposed SSG&A would capture.  
Second, if advertising spending were highly correlated with other costs captured in 
SG&A, then the two new variables (SADV and SPSG&A) would be highly correlated, and 
interpretation of those variables’ parameter estimates would be clouded by problems of 
multicollinearity. 
We address these concerns by considering correlations.  Rather than consider 
simple correlations, though, we first account for the unbalanced panel structure of the 
data and calculate “adjusted” correlations.18  We find that the adjusted correlation 
between SSG&A and SADV is -0.17 and the adjusted correlation between SSG&A and SPSG&A is 
0.61, indicating that the variation in SG&A is not driven primarily by advertising 
spending and further indicating that SPSG&A is a reasonable proxy for SSG&A.  We also find 
                                                 
18 See ‘Empirical Estimation and Results’ section and Table 3 for a more complete explanation of these 
adjusted correlations. 
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that the correlation between SADV and SPSG&A is -0.06, indicating that the two variables 
move almost independently and that the relationship between these two variables will not 
hamper interpretation of their parameter estimates. 
Given the above, predictor variables for both our model of firm value (CAR) and 
our model of analysts’ forecasts (PVE) will be SINV, SAR, SGM, SPSG&A, and SADV. 
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CHAPTER 10: MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Lev and Thiagarajan (1993) constructed the fundamental signals from publicly 
reported accounting information to demonstrate that this information provides insights 
into firm value, CAR.  Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) and Amir et al. (2003) confirmed 
the significance of the fundamental signals as predictors of CAR, and Amir et al. (2003) 
went on to demonstrate that these fundamental signals are also significant predictors of 
analysts’ forecasts.  Further, Amir et al. (2003) added PVE as a predictor variable in their 
model of CAR to estimate the incremental contribution of analysts’ forecasts beyond 
accounting information in explaining CAR.  Likewise, they added CAR as a predictor of 
PVE, since financial analysts may learn from stock investors and adjust their forecasts 
based on changes in stock prices (Abarbanell 1991).  To address potential endogeneity 
between CAR and PVE, we applied two-stage least square estimation (2SLS) models 
with instruments.  
If, as hypothesized, the market responds to SADV but analysts do not, then we 
would expect errors in analysts’ forecasts to be related to SADV.  To address this question, 
we follow previous accounting studies on analysts’ forecast errors, defining forecast error 
(FERR) as “actual” earnings for the next year minus the forecasts for those earnings.  Our 
model tests the impact of SADV on FERR, using accounting and finance variables shown 
to be related to FERR, fundamental signals, and year dummies as control variables 
(Albrecht et al. 1997; Brown et al. 1987; Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Amir et al. 2003).  
Because forecast error models conventionally consider a one-year time horizon, while 
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CAR and PVE models consider a five-year time horizon, we estimate models to confirm 
that the relationship between FERR and SADV is the result of SADV impacting actual 
earnings (AEPS) but not earnings forecasts (FEPS).   
 
CAR and PVE Models:  Fixed-Effects Two Stage Least Square Estimation (FE-
2SLS) Model 
 
Accepting the contention that PVE and CAR need to be included in the models of 
CAR and PVE, respectively, we build from Amir et al.’s (2003) 2SLS models to test 
Hypotheses H1 and H2.   PVE is an endogenous variable in the model for CAR, and 
CAR is an endogenous variable in the model of PVE.  We treat SADV, the fundamental 
signal predictor variables, and the accounting and finance control variables as exogenous 
variables.  
Instruments.  To deal with potential endogeneity between CAR and PVE, our 
models need instruments that will be included during first-stage analyses but will not be 
included during second-stage analyses.  Instruments in Amir et al. (2003) include firm 
size (SIZE), book-to-market ratio (BTM), one-year-lagged PVE (L_PVE), one-year-
lagged CAR (L_CAR),19 one-year-lagged EPS (L_EPS), and year dummies.  Following 
Amir et al. (2003), we use all of these variables as instruments during first stage analysis 
of the model for CAR, and use all of these variables except L_CAR as instruments during 
first-stage analysis of the model for PVE.     
                                                 
19 L_CAR was used as an instrument in the model of PVE and as a control variable in the model of CAR.  
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Models.  In the first-stage analysis of the model for CAR, we estimate the 
reduced-form equation for PVE (a variable endogenous to CAR) as a function of 
exogenous variables (SADV, fundamental signal predictors, and control variables) and the 
instruments specified by Amir et al. (2003).  In the second-stage analysis of the model for 
CAR, we estimate the structural equation for CAR as a function of exogenous variables 
from first-stage analysis and predicted PVE from first-stage analysis ( PVE ), which has 
been constructed to also be exogenous.   
 
Similarly, in the first-stage analysis of the model for PVE, we estimate the 
reduced-form equation for CAR (a variable endogenous to PVE) as a function of 
exogenous variables (SADV, fundamental signals, and control variables) and the 
instruments specified by Amir et al. (2003).  In the second-stage analysis of the model for 
PVE, we estimate the structural equation for PVE with the exogenous variables from the 
first-stage analysis and with predicted CAR from the first-stage analysis ( CAR ), which 
has been constructed to also be exogenous.    
Since our data is an unbalanced panel with repeated observations for a firm 
(Baltagi and Wu 1999; Bhargava, Franzini, and Narendranathan 1982; Wooldridge 2002), 
we adapt Amir et al.’s (2003) procedure by including firm-specific fixed effects and 
allow an AR(1) correction of errors at each stage of the 2SLS model.  Thus, our fixed-
effects two-stage least square estimation (FE-2SLS) models have the following 
structures: 
(1) 1st stage model for CAR:     itiitit XPVE 11' ενβα +++=         
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(2) 2nd stage model for CAR:    itiititit PVEXCAR 22 ενγβα ++++=   
(3) 1st stage model for PVE:      itiitit YCAR 33' ενβα +++=                 
(4) 2nd stage model for PVE:     itiititit CARYPVE 44 ενγβα ++++=  
where 
;,..,1;,..,1 iTtNi ==  
itX
' , itY ' = SADV, SINV, SAR, SGM, SPSG&A, ETR, EPS, L_CAR, BTM, SIZE, L_PVE, 
L_EPS, year dummies;  
itX = SADV, SINV, SAR, SGM, SPSG&A, ETR, EPS; 
itY = SADV, SINV, SAR, SGM, SPSG&A, ETR, EPS, L_CAR; 
jiν  (j = 1,2,3,4) = fixed-effects for a firm i, which may be correlated with itititit YXYX ,,, '' ;   
jitjitjit ηρεε += − 1  (j = 1,2,3,4, || ρ  < 1, jitη  ~ i.i.d. ),0( 2ησN ); 
PVE  = instrumental variable for PVE, predicted in the first-stage model (1); 
CAR  = instrumental variable for CAR, predicted in the first-stage model (3). 
 
CAR and PVE Models: Reduced-form Fixed-Effects Regression Model  
 
We borrowed the instruments from Amir et al. (2003), assuming that those 
instruments are uncorrelated with errors in the structural equations for CAR and PVE, 
and are partially correlated with the endogenous variables, PVE and CAR (Wooldridge 
2002).  However, if pre-specified exogenous variables explain a much larger portion of 
the variation of the endogenous variable than do the instruments in the reduced-from 
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equations 1 and 3, then the predicted instrumental variables, PVE  and CAR , may cause a 
multicollinearity problem in the second-stage models (equations 2 and 4).  A high degree 
of multicollinearity between a predicted instrumental variable and the remaining 
exogenous variables in the second-stage model would increase the asymptotic variances 
of the FE-2SLS estimators, making the coefficients for our exogenous variables less 
significant, possibly masking a significant relationship between SADV and PVE 
(Wooldridge 2002). 
Due to this potential threat, we propose the reduced-form equations for PVE and 
CAR (equations 1 and 3) as an alternative way to investigate the relationship between 
SADV and PVE and the relationship between SADV and CAR.  SADV’s coefficient in the 
reduced-form equation will not be affected by the potential multicollinearity in the 
second-stage analysis just discussed.  Hence, consideration of the sign and significance of 
the coefficients for SADV in the reduced-form models provides a robustness check on the 
tests of our hypotheses. 
 
Forecast Error (FERR) Model 
 
Prior studies have shown that analysts often issue biased earnings forecasts 
(O’Brien 1988; Mendenhall 1991), and that they under- or over-react to publicly 
available information, lowering the accuracy of earnings forecasts (DeBondt et al. 1990; 
Abarbanell and Bernard 1992).  Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) showed that annual 
earnings change (d_EPS, which is (EPSt-EPSt-1)/Pt-1) and some of the fundamental 
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signals described earlier in this paper are associated with forecast error.  Amir et al. 
(2003) found that analysts’ failure to account for firms’ R&D intensity (PRND) increased 
forecast error.  Because earnings forecasts will be more precise when a firm’s actual 
earnings are stable over time, previous accounting studies (Albrecht et al. 1977; Brown et 
al. 1987; Amir et al. 2003) have included firm size (SIZE: larger firms should have more 
stable earnings), firm age (AGE: older firms should have more stable earnings), and 
earnings variability (EAR_VAR), as predictor variables in models of forecast error. 
Definitions of Variables and Forecast Error Models.  We examine the effects of 
SADV on the quality of analysts’ next-period earnings forecasts by regressing forecast 
error (FERR) on SADV and the control variables considered in accounting studies of 
forecast error:  fundamental signal predictor variables, d_EPS, PRND, SIZE, AGE, and 
EAR_VAR.  
Since our data are an unbalanced panel with repeated observations, our fixed-
effects formulation allows for AR(1) specification of errors:  
(5) Forecast error model:  itiititit AdEffXFERR ενθβα ++++=         
where, 
;,....,1;,....,1 iTtNi ==  
itX = SINV, SAR, SGM, SPSG&A, ETR, d_EPS, SIZE, EAR_VAR, PRND, AGE, year 
dummies; 
iv  = fixed-effects for a firm i, which may be correlated with itX ;   
ititit ηρεε += − 1  ( || ρ  < 1, itη  ~ i.i.d. ),0( 2ησN ). 
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CHAPTER 11: ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
 
Data 
 
The data for our study come from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and I/B/E/S for 1982 to 
2000.  From COMPUSTAT, we collected all the items necessary to calculate our focal 
variable (SADV), fundamental signal predictor variables, control variables, and instruments.  
For CAR and PVE models, we retrieved 60 monthly stock returns from CRSP to 
calculate CAR and the systematic risk of a firm, β .  From I/B/E/S, we took consensus 
analysts’ forecasts of earnings for five years into the future to calculate a firm’s PVE.  
For the forecast error model, we took next year’s actual earnings from COMPUSTAT 
and next year’s consensus earnings forecast from I/B/E/S.   
The dataset used to estimate our CAR and PVE models includes 8,232 firm-year 
observations for 1,739 firms.  The sample includes approximately 500 firms per year 
from 1982 to 1993, and approximately 350 firms per year from 1994 to 2000.  This 
decline of sample size beginning in 1994 occurred because of missing observations for 
advertising expenditure (DATA45) in COMPUSTAT.  In our models, annual dummies 
should absorb much of the noise that the sample size reduction might induce.   
The observations deleted for lack of data on advertising expenditure also cause 
our sample to be smaller than the sample analyzed by Amir et al. (2003).  To be sure that 
this reduction did not cause our sample to differ in other important ways from the sample 
used by Amir et al. (2003), we compared our variables’ means, standard deviations, and 
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correlations to those reported by Amir et al. (2003, p. 641-642) and found no important 
differences.  Details of this comparison are available from the authors. 
 
Correlational Evidence Regarding Hypotheses 1 and 2 
 
While we used our raw correlation matrix to check for differences from Amir et al. 
(2003) that might have been introduced by excluding observations for which advertising 
expenditure was missing, we do not use those raw correlations to get a preliminary 
indication of the relationship between SADV and CAR and PVE, nor do we use those raw 
correlations to explore possible multicollinearity.  Because our data come from an 
unbalanced panel with repeated observations for a firm, our models include fixed effects 
and an AR(1) error structure.  To create correlations that reflect the fixed effect and 
AR(1) structure, we created an “adjusted” correlation matrix in which we represent each 
variable by the residuals from a regression model with that variable as the dependent 
variable and with fixed effects, year dummies, and an AR(1) correction of autocorrelation 
in error (McAlister et al. 2007, p 40).  We report the “adjusted” correlation matrix in 
Table 3.  Consistent with our hypotheses, the “adjusted” correlation matrix indicates that 
the correlation between SADV and CAR is positive and significant (0.04, p < 0.01), and 
that the correlation between SADV and PVE is insignificant (-0.01, p > 0.1).  These 
adjusted correlations are consistent with the stock market responding to SADV and with 
financial analysts ignoring SADV.  
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The adjusted correlations in Table 3 also suggest that multicollinearity is not 
likely to be an issue in our CAR and PVE models (the highest correlation in the matrix is 
0.49, p < 0.01, between L_CAR and L_PVE).  Furthermore, the VIFs (Variance Inflation 
Factors), which assess the potential for a multicollinearity problem in our FE-2SLS 
models, were well below 5: (average = 1.18, maximum = 1.56 for equation 1 and 
equation 3; average = 1.30, maximum = 2.05 for equation 2; and average = 1.22 
maximum = 1.64 for equation 4), suggesting that our study’s findings are not distorted by 
multicollinearity (Judge et al. 1988).  
 
CAR and PVE Models: Fixed-Effects Two Stage Least Square Estimation (FE-
2SLS) Model    
 
We checked first-order autocorrelation in jitε  (j = 1,2,3,4 in models 1-4) based on 
the AR(1) autocorrelation test in Wooldridge (2002, p. 282).  The test rejected the null 
hypothesis of no AR(1) autocorrelation in jitε  for all four models, supporting the 
inclusion of the AR(1) error specification.  Results of the Hausman specification tests 
(Hausman 1978) supported that including fixed-effects in all four models was appropriate.  
We report the estimation results of the second-stage models (equations 2 and 4) in 
column 1 and column 2 of Table 4.   
R-squares (within) for the models (equations 2 and 4) were 0.06 and 0.17, 
respectively, and the models were statistically significant (F(8,5138) = 42.6, p < 0.01; 
F(9,5137) = 116.5, p < 0.01).  The estimated coefficients for our focal variable revealed 
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that SADV (b = 0.02, p < 0.01) had a significant and positive coefficient in the model of 
CAR (equation 2), and that SADV (b = 0.00, p > 0.1) was insignificant in the model of 
PVE (equation 4).  The results strongly support our Hypotheses H1 and H2.   
Alternative Specification for Analysts’ Forecasts.  For a robustness check, we 
estimated the same 2SLS models (equations 1 - 4) with an alternative measure of 
analysts’ forecasts, N_PVE, which is the present value of consensus earnings forecasts 
only for the next fiscal year (in contrast to PVE which is consensus earnings forecasts for 
the next five years).  While PVE is a measure of analysts’ expected value of the firm, that 
estimate involves expected earnings for the next five years.  To rule out the possibility 
that it is noise in analysts’ estimates of earnings two, three, four, and five years out that 
keep us from detecting analysts’ use of SADV in expected firm value, we test our 
hypotheses with N_PVE.  We report the results in column 3 and column 4 of Table 4.  
Although the R-squares (within) were lower (0.05 and 0.05 for equations 2 and 4 using 
N_PVE, versus 0.06 and 0.17 for equations 2 and 4 using PVE), models using N_PVE 
were statistically significant (F(8,5138) = 34.8, p < 0.01; F(9,4300) = 26.3, p < 0.01).  
Consistent with the 2SLS results reported above, we found that SADV (b = 0.02, p < 0.01) 
had a significant positive coefficient in the model of CAR, and that SADV (b = 0.00, p > 
0.1) was insignificant in the model of N_PVE.  Thus, our findings relating SADV to firm 
value and analysts’ forecasts are robust to the alternative measure of the present value of 
future earnings forecasts, N_PVE.20   
                                                 
20 Based on a suggestion by Dr. Clement, one of the committee members, I also tested a measure for firm 
value forecasted by analysts, which includes analysts’ present expectation of the value of earnings and 
dividends that continue into perpetuity in the future.  Consistent with H2, SADV was insignificant (b = 0.04, 
p > 0.1) in the model to predict the alternative measure of analysts’ expectation of firm value.  
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In summary, results of CAR and PVE FE-2SLS estimation consistently show that 
SADV has a significant positive coefficient in the model for market value (CAR) and that 
SADV has an insignificant coefficient in the model for analysts’ forecasts (PVE and 
N_PVE).  Because the strength of the relationship between instruments and endogenous 
variables can impact the efficiency of estimated coefficients in the second stage of 2SLS 
estimation (Wooldridge 2002), we next consider results from estimating reduced-form 
models not vulnerable to that inefficiency.  
 
CAR and PVE Models: Reduced-form Fixed-Effects Regression Model  
 
Our tests for serial correlation rejected the null hypothesis of no first-order 
autocorrelation in itε  for both the reduced-form model of CAR and for the reduced-form 
model of PVE, supporting our AR(1) specification for itε .  We report the estimation 
results of the proposed reduced-form models in column 1 and column 2 of Table 5.     
 The reduced-form PVE and CAR models (equations 1 and 3) are statistically 
significant (F(29,5117) = 37.9, p < 0.01; F(29,5117) = 47.7, p < 0.01) with R-squares 
(within) of 0.18 and 0.21, indicating that our models fit well.  In considering the impact 
of our focal variable, the results show that the estimated coefficient for SADV (b = 0.02, p 
< 0.01) is significant and positive in the CAR model and insignificant (b = 0.00, p > 0.1) 
in the PVE model, strongly supporting our hypotheses.21  The results for the reduced-
                                                 
21 Since Amir et al. (2003) considered R&D intensity (PRND) as an intangible to be related to firm value, 
for a robustness check, we estimated the models (equations 1 and 3) with R&D intensity (PRND) as 
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form model of N_PVE, the alternative one-year measure of analysts’ forecasts, also 
indicate that SADV (b = 0.00, p > 0.1) was insignificant in the model of N_PVE as 
hypothesized (column 3 of Table 5).  Thus, the finding that SADV does not have a 
significant coefficient in the model of analysts’ forecasts was robust to the alternative 
measure, N_PVE, in the reduced-form model.     
For another robustness check, we estimated the proposed reduced-form models 
(equation 1 and equation 3) using a first-differencing method that incorporates firm-
specific fixed effects and potential AR(1) autocorrelations in error (Boulding and Staelin 
1995).  We created a difference variable as the difference between the variable at time t 
and at time t-1.  Using the first-differenced predictor variables and SADV, we estimated 
first-differenced CAR and PVE.  The results were consistent with our Hypotheses H1 and 
H2 for SADV. 
22   
In sum, consistent with the results from the FE-2SLS models, the results from the 
reduced-form models indicate that SADV enhances the market value of a stock, even after 
controlling for the factors that accounting researchers have shown to be related to that 
market value.  Further, the results reveal that financial analysts do not incorporate the 
impact of a firm’s advertising effectiveness, SADV, in their forecasts of that firm’s future 
earnings. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
another predictor variable.  The results for SADV were not changed and PRND was not significant in any of 
the model specifications (results not reported here).              
22 We also tested a model that regressed first-differenced PVE (PVEt – PVEt-1) on the fundamental signals, 
control variables, and SADV because first-differenced PVE may be more comparable to CAR which is 
difference between actual and expected returns.  Consistent with H2, the coefficient for SADV was not 
significant (b= -0.001, p > 0.1).  The results are available on request. 
 72 
Earnings Forecast Error (FERR) Model 
 
The results in the previous section showed that SADV did impact firm value but did 
not affect analysts’ forecasts of future earnings (Tables 4 and 5).  So long as the firm 
value, CAR, is closely related to earnings (EPS) (and adjusted correlation of CAR and 
EPS = 0.4 in Table 3), these findings suggest that SADV should be positively associated 
with earnings forecast error (FERR).   
Data and Adjusted Correlations.  We estimate the model (equation 5) with 3,741 
firm-year observations for 782 firms.23  Consistent with H3, the adjusted correlation 
between SADV and FERR is positive and significant (0.05, p < 0.01).  In addition, 
multicollinearity should not cloud the interpretation of the coefficient of SADV, since the 
highest adjusted correlation with SADV was with SPSG&A (adjusted correlation = 0.17), and 
the mean of VIFs was less than 5: (average = 1.92; maximum = 2.39). 
Empirical Results.  Tests for serial correlation of error failed to reject the null 
hypotheses of no AR(1) autocorrelation in itε  (p = 0.62).  Thus, we estimated the fixed-
effects model (equation 5) without AR(1) specification of errors.   
In the model for FERR (column 1 of Table 6), the coefficient for SADV (b = 0.01, p 
< 0.01) was significant and positive, indicating that higher levels of SADV are associated 
with larger forecast errors, providing strong support for H3.24   
                                                 
23 Missing observations in actual earnings (AEPS) in I/B/E/S led to smaller sample size for forecast error 
model than sample size for FE-2SLS model.  Adjusted correlation matrix for this data is available from the 
authors.     
24 I also estimated a forecast revision model.  The forecast revision was measured as the difference between 
analysts’ forecasts of next-year EPS before 10-K release date and after 10-K release date.  If SADV surprised 
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The Impact of SADV on Actual Next-Period Earnings and on Forecasts of those 
Earnings.  To rule out the possibility that the relationship between SADV and FERR is 
driven by a relationship between SADV and next-period forecasted earnings, we regress 
both next-period forecasted earnings (FEPS) and actual next-period earnings (AEPS) on 
SADV and the control variables specified for the forecast error model.  For these models, 
the null hypothesis of no serial correlation in error was rejected, thus the estimated 
models include fixed effects and AR(1) specification of errors.  Column 2 and column 3 
of Table 6 contain the results for the AEPS model and the FEPS model.  The models 
were significant (F(28,2323) = 21.4, p < 0.01; F(28,2323) = 14.9, p < 0.01), and R-
squares (within) were 0.21 and 0.15, respectively.  Consistent with H3-a) and H3-b), the 
coefficient of SADV (b = 0.12, p < 0.05) was significant and positive in the AEPS model 
(column 2 in Table 6), and the coefficient of SADV (b = -0.01, p > 0.1) was insignificant in 
the FEPS model.  These results confirm the fact that the relationship between SADV and 
forecast error is driven by SADV’s impact on actual earnings rather than by a relationship 
between SADV and forecasts. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysts, SADV is expected to have a significant impact on the forecast revision measure.  Consistent with 
H3, I found no evidence that SADV was used in the forecast revision. 
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CHAPTER 12: DISCUSSION 
 
 
According to the resource-based view of the firm, superior marketing capabilities 
create competitive advantage, thereby enhancing firm value.  Several empirical marketing 
studies have demonstrated the link between marketing capability and firm value (Dutta et 
al. 1999; Mittal et al. 2005; Luo and Donthu 2006).  However, despite this theory and 
empirical evidence, it is not clear that the financial community understands or appreciates 
this link between marketing and firm value (Srivastava and Reibstein 2005). 
In our study, we proposed a simple “fundamental advertising signal” that is built 
from publicly reported accounting numbers.  SADV (∆Sales – ∆Advertising) reflects the 
extent to which a firm’s sales are growing faster than its advertising expenditure.  While 
this measure does not directly capture advertising’s longer term creation of brand equity, 
it has several virtues as a starting metric for research into the link between advertising 
effectiveness and firm value.  First, the fact that the structure of the advertising 
effectiveness measure is simple makes it reasonable to imagine that investors and 
financial analysts could routinely consider such a measure when estimating the value of a 
firm.  Second, the fact that this SADV is built with publicly reported accounting numbers 
implies that those component accounting numbers have been audited and are, 
consequently, credible.  Finally, the fact that the structure of SADV is consistent with the 
structure that leading accounting researchers have suggested for “fundamental signals” of 
other forces that might change firm value gives the measure further credibility with a 
possibly skeptical financial community. 
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While we would like to study the impact on firm value of marketing effectiveness 
(rather than exploring just the impact of advertising effectiveness), we are limited by the 
nature of publicly reported accounting data.  We know that non-advertising marketing 
expenditures are included in publicly reported SG&A, but it is impossible to separate 
those non-advertising marketing expenditures from other SG&A expenditures using 
publicly reported data.  Consequently, this study focuses on that which we can measure, 
advertising effectiveness, and it is notable to find that breaking SSG&A into SADV and 
SPSG&A enhances the accuracy of predictions of firm value.     
 
The Impact of SADV on Firm Value   
 
Our study joins a growing literature on linking marketing metrics to firm value by 
showing that advertising effectiveness is positively associated with cumulative abnormal 
stock returns even after controlling for accounting fundamentals, earnings, firm 
characteristics, and year dummies, in a fixed-effects formulation with AR(1) correction 
of errors (Boulding and Staelin 1998).  Unlike the prior studies linking marketing 
effectiveness to firm value that were limited to a specific industry or to “major” firms, we 
generalize the finding that advertising effectiveness impacts firm value with a large 
dataset (8,232 observations for 1,739 firms) including firms from many industries for 19 
years from 1982 to 2000.   
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 Methodologically, our study introduces to the marketing literature a new approach 
for demonstrating the link between marketing and firm value using cumulative abnormal 
stock return, CAR, as firm value. 
 
Analysts’ Under-reactions to SADV   
 
Our finding that consensus analyst forecasts are not impacted by advertising 
effectiveness is notable.  This finding is consistent with Amir et al.’s (2003) 
demonstration that R&D intangibles are not fully captured in analysts’ forecasts.  The 
finding is also consistent with reports from Wall Street and with accounting research that 
shows that analysts under-react to value-relevant accounting information (Abarbanell and 
Bushee 1997; Amir et al. 2003; Cheng 2005).  Our work contributes to this literature by 
showing that analysts also under-react to this not-previously-studied signal: SADV. 
 
Managerial Implications 
  
The results of our study have important implications for managers.  First, 
consistent with Srivastava et al.’s (1998) and Rust et al.’s (2004) exhortation that 
marketers use the “language of finance” when demonstrating the value of marketing, the 
proposed metric, SADV, is based on publicly reported accounting data and is structured in 
a way that is consistent with existing financial models. 
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 Second, if our results stimulate financial analysts to look at advertising 
effectiveness separately from general expenses in SG&A, perhaps the importance of 
recognizing marketing as a value-driver may become clearer to the whole financial 
community. 
 Third, our results suggest that top management might find it valuable to also 
consider longer-term effects of marketing.  In a recent Marketing Science Institute’s 
(MSI) Trustees Meeting presentation, Sawhney (2007) proposed that marketing has three 
primary tasks, each with its own time horizon.  In the short run, marketing’s challenge is 
to generate sales.  In the medium term, marketing’s challenge is to create customer equity 
and brand equity.  In the long term, marketing’s challenge is to create new markets.  
While our proposed SADV measure is probably a reasonable metric for measuring 
marketing’s progress against its short term challenges, additional metrics need to be 
created to measure marketing’s progress against its medium- and long-term challenges.  
Calculating marketing’s effectiveness against these medium- and long-term measures 
will make it necessary to understand that some of marketing’s spending is investment and 
should be treated as such in financial planning. 
Finally, the study’s findings point out the importance of understanding the 
antecedents of SADV.  At the micro level, it is expected that designing better advertising 
programs (e.g., more efficient media budget allocation, use of pulsing strategy, etc.) may 
increase SADV.  Thus, marketing executives need to maintain their vigilance and regularly 
evaluate their marketing programs in terms of their impact on SADV.  With this metric, it 
may be time for firms’ senior marketing executives to step into the boardroom and report 
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the contribution of their decisions to SADV and, consequently, to earnings forecasts and 
firm value.  
 
In summary, to our knowledge, this is the first marketing study to go beyond 
anecdotal evidence or surveys and use a large accounting dataset across industries to 
examine financial analysts’ reactions to the fundamental signal from advertising.  We 
hope that this study’s findings facilitate the communication between marketing and 
finance scholars and practitioners.  
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FIGURE 1A: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF FIRM SIZE  
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FIGURE 1B: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF SYSTEMATIC RISK (BETA) 
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Mean (standard deviation) = 1.042 (0.527) 
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND BIVARIATE CORRELATION MATRIX FOR VARIABLES IN 
PROPOSED MODEL 
Variables  Mean (Std) 1. 2. 3.  4.  5.  6.  7.  8. 9. 10. 
1. Systematic risk 
 
1.042 
(0.527) 
1.000          
2. Lagged 
advertising/sales 
 
0.040 
(0.053) 
-0.051 1.000         
3. Lagged R&D/sales 
 
0.068 
(0.120) 
0.228 0.155 1.000        
4. Growth 
 
0.081 
(0.112) 
0.147 -0.019 0.002 1.000       
5. Leverage 
 
0.410 
(0.237) 
0.058 0.068 -0.036 -0.121 1.000      
6. Liquidity 
 
3.153 
(2.989) 
0.104 0.083 0.380 0.056 -0.369 1.000     
7. Asset size 
 
5.167 
(2.221) 
-0.389 0.046 -0.164 -0.009 0.105 0.340 1.000    
8. Earnings variability 
 
0.077     
(0.159) 
0.220 0.005 0.054 -0.250 0.181 -0.052 -0.174 1.000   
9. Dividend payout 
 
0.388  
(0.853) 
-0.024 -0.004 0.003 -0.025 0.002 -0.012 0.028  1.000  
10. Age 
 
19.152 
(0.112) 
-0.392 0.079 -0.189 -0.154 0.107 -0.243 -0.105 -0.128 0.022 1.000 
11. Competitive  
intensity 
0.399 
(0.112) 
0.065 -0.182 -0.076 -0.047 0.009 -0.016 0.629 0.060 -0.004 -0.071 
Note: All correlations greater than 0.220 are significant at p < 0.01, all correlations greater than 0.11 are significant at p < 0.05, and all correlations greater than 0.023 are 
significant at p < 0.10.  
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TABLE 2: ADVERTISING, R&D, AND SYSTEMATIC RISK: ESTIMATION RESULTS   
 
Variable (Column 1) (Column 2) (Column 3) (Column 4) (Column 5) (Column 6) 
Minimum number of 
returns observations for 
estimating beta 
 
60 
 
60 
 
50 
 
50 
 
60 
 
60 
Market return used in 
estimating beta 
Equal-weighted Value-weighted Equal Weighted Value-weighted Equal-weighted Value-weighted 
Model Specification Levels of 
Variables 
Levels of 
variables 
Levels of 
variables 
Levels of 
variables 
Changes in 
variables 
Changes in  
variables a 
Intercept  -0.54 (0.04)*** -0.22 (0.04)*** -0.60 (0.04)*** -0.28 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.01)* 
Lagged Advertising/sales -3.19 (0.75)*** - 2.28 (0.79)*** -3.42 (0.71)*** -1.85 (0.73)*** -2.61 (0.58)*** -0.02 (0.00)*** 
Lagged R&D/sales -0.50 (0.18)*** -0.99 (0.19)*** -0.47 (0.18)*** -1.00 (0.18)*** -0.20 (0.12)* -0.01 (0.00)** 
Growth 0.36 (0.08)*** 0.40 (0.09)** 0.34 (0.08)*** 0.38 (0.09)** 0.44 (0.07)*** 0.03 (0.00)*** 
Leverage 0.52 (0.12)*** 0.01 (0.13) 0.48 (0.12)*** -0.07 (0.12) 0.46 (0.09)*** 0.02 (0.00)*** 
Liquidity 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 
Asset size -0.09 (0.03)*** -0.09 (0.03)*** -0.11 (0.03)*** -0.09 (0.03)*** -0.01 (0.03) -0.00 (0.00) 
Earnings variability -0.02 (0.03) -0.06 (0.03)* -0.08 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) -0.00 (0.00) 
Dividend payout 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 
Age -0.02 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.01)** -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01)*** - - 
Competitive intensity  -0.89 (0.34)*** -0.60 (0.35)* -0.83 (0.33)*** -0.07 (0.34)* -0.53 (0.33) -0.01 (0.01) 
Serial correlation (ρ) 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 - - 
Overall R-sq (Within)  0.16 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.05 0.05 
Number of firms 
(observations) 
644 (3198) 644 (3198) 711 (3457) 711 (3457) 644 (3198) 644 (3198) 
F (d. f.) 17.9 (671, 2527) 11.1 (671, 2527) 18.5 (738, 2719) 11.4 (738, 2719) 6.9 (25, 3172) 6.9 (25, 3172) 
Note: Coefficient (standard errors) are in the columns. The models also include window dummies, some of which are significant at p < 0.01. 
 *** denotes p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, and * p < 0.10.  
a We used factor-scored predictor variables for this model.  
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TABLE 3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND ADJUSTED CORRELATION MATRIX FOR VARIABLES IN 
PROPOSED FE-2SLS MODELS (EQUATIONS 1 – 4) 
Variables Mean (Std) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 
1. PVE 0.43(0.28) 1             
2. CAR -0.03(0.33) 0.39 1            
3. L_PVE 0.46(0.30) 0.35 -0.03 1           
4. L_CAR -0.02(0.34) 0.09 -0.05 0.49 1          
5. EPS 0.03(0.11) 0.40 0.10 0.28 0.19 1         
6. L_EPS 0.04(0.09) 0.10 -0.14 0.42 0.21 0.16 1        
7. SIZE 5.81(2.03) 0.29 0.02c 0.43 0.19 0.31 0.25 1       
8. BTM 0.25(0.54) -0.02c -0.05 0.03 -0.02b -0.08 -0.00c -0.15 1      
9. SINV 0.03(0.53) -0.04 -0.08 0.05 0.03 0.00
c 0.06 0.06 -0.00c 1     
10. SAR  0.01(0.32) 0.01
c -0.01c 0.01c 0.01c 0.01c 0.05 0.02b 0.00c 0.09 1    
11. SGM  -0.01(0.14) -0.21 -0.15 -0.16 -0.19 -0.28 0.08 -0.13 -0.01
c 0.07 0.02b 1   
12. SPSG&A  0.01(0.22) -0.09 -0.11 -0.01
c -0.11 -0.13 0.06 -0.02c 0.05 0.09 0.06 -0.04 1  
13. ETR -0.00(0.04) 0.02b -0.02b 0.04 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.03 -0.02c -0.00c 0.00c -0.05 0.01c 1 
14. SADV -0.04(0.75) -0.01
c 0.04 -0.04 0.01c 0.02c -0.04 -0.04 -0.02c -0.01c -0.03 0.01c -0.06 0.01c 
Note: This correlation matrix is based on the residuals obtained by regressing each predictor variable on year dummies and fixed effects, incorporating AR(1) 
autocorrelations in errors.    
b 0.05 < p < 0.10.  
c p > 0.10. 
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TABLE 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE SECOND STAGE MODEL IN FE-2SLS WITH AN AR(1) 
CORRECTION OF ERRORS (EQUATION 2 AND 4) 
 
 PVE Estimated with 5 years of EPS forecasts PVE Estimated with 1 year of EPS forecasts 
 (Column 1: Equation 2) (Column 2: Equation 4) (Column 3: Equation 2) (Column 4: Equation 4) 
Dependent variable CAR PVE CAR N_PVEa 
Intercept -0.33 (0.03)*** 0.40 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.02)* 0.07 (0.00)*** 
         SADV (Advertising signal) 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.00) 
Fundamental signal predictor variables      
         SINV (inventory) -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.05 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.00)** 
         SAR (accounts receivable) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.02) -0.00 (0.00) 
         SGM (gross margin) -0.25 (0.04)*** -0.15 (0.03)*** -0.32 (0.04)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
         SPSG&A (SG&A-ADV) -0.14 (0.02)*** -0.09 (0.02)*** -0.19 (0.02)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Accounting/Finance control variables     
         ETR (effective tax rate) -0.19 (0.12) -0.31 (0.06)*** -0.46 (0.11)*** -0.06 (0.03)** 
         EPS (earning per share) -0.32 (0.09)*** 0.80 (0.03)*** 0.42 (0.07)*** 0.22 (0.02)*** 
         L_CAR (lagged CAR) - -0.11 (0.01)*** - -0.03 (0.01)*** 
Predicted endogenous variables     
        CAR  - -0.05 (0.04) - -0.09 (0.02)*** 
        PVE  0.76 (0.09)*** - - - 
        PVEN _  - - -0.83 (0.29)*** - 
Serial correlation ( ρ ) 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.77 
Overall R-sq (Within) 0.04 (0.06) 0.18 (0.17) 0.07 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 
Number of firms (observations) 1347 (6493) 1347 (6493) 1347 (6493) 1110 (5419) 
F (d.f.) 42.6 (8,5138) 116.5 (9,5137) 34.8 (8,5138) 26.3 (9,4300) 
* p - value < 0.10.  ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Notes: Coefficients (standard errors) are in the columns.   
a N_PVE is the present value of consensus forecasts of EPS for the next fiscal year-end. 
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TABLE 5: ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR REDUCED-FORM FIXED-EFFECTS REGRESSION MODEL WITH AN 
AR(1) CORRECTION OF ERRORS (EQUATION 1 AND 3)  
 
 PVE Estimated with 5 years of EPS forecasts PVE Estimated with 1 year of EPS forecasts 
 (Column 1: Equation 1) (Column 2 : Equation 3) (Column 3 : Equation 3) 
Dependent variable CAR PVE N_PVEa 
Intercept  -0.42 (0.04)*** 0.12 (0.03)*** 0.11 (0.01)*** 
         SADV (Advertising signal) 0.02 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Fundamental signal predictor variables     
         SINV (inventory) -0.03 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.00) 
         SAR (accounts receivable) 0.29 (0.01)** 0.02 (0.01)** -0.00 (0.00) 
         SGM (gross margin) -0.32 (0.04)*** -0.13 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.01) 
         SPSG&A (SG&A-ADV) -0.20 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01) 
Accounting/Finance control variables 
controls variables 
   
         ETR (effective tax rate) -0.38 (0.10)*** -0.27 (0.06)*** -0.03 (0.02) 
         EPS (earning per share) 0.28 (0.05)*** 0.70 (0.03)*** 0.18 (0.01)*** 
         L_CAR (lagged CAR) - -0.08 (0.01)*** 0.00 (0.00) 
Instruments    
         BTM (Book to Market Ratio) -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.00 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00)** 
         SIZE (firm size) 0.08 (0.01)*** 0.04 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.00)** 
         L_PVE (lagged PVE) 0.04 (0.02) -0.06 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01)*** 
         L_CAR (lagged CAR) -0.32 (0.01)*** - - 
         L_EPS (lagged EPS) -0.40 (0.06)*** 0.00 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02)*** 
Serial correlation (-) 0.30 0.31 0.73 
Overall R-sq (within R-sq) 0.03 (0.18) 0.08 (0.21) 0.01 (0.09) 
Number of firms (observations) 1347 (6493) 1347 (6493) 1110 (5419) 
F (d.f.) 37.9 (29,5117) 47.7 (29,5117) 13.9 (29,4280) 
* p - value < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Notes: Coefficients (standard errors) are in the columns. The models also included year dummies in all specifications. We 
do not report estimated coefficients for year dummies.  a N_PVE is the present value of consensus forecasts of EPS for the next fiscal year-end.   
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TABLE 6: THE IMPACT OF SADV ON NEXT-PERIOD EARNINGS, NEXT-PERIOD EARNINGS FORECASTS, 
AND ERRORS IN NEXT-PERIOD EARNINGS FORECASTS 
* p - value < 0.10. ** p < 0.05. *** p < 0.01. Notes: Coefficients (standard errors) are in the columns. The models also included year dummies in all specifications. We 
do not report estimated coefficients for year dummies.   
 (Column 1)Equation 5 (Column 2) (Column 3) 
Estimation Methods Fixed Effects Fixed Effects / AR(1) Fixed Effects / AR(1) 
Dependent variable Forecast Error (FERR) Actual Earnings (AEPS) Forecasted Earnings (FEPS) 
Intercept -0.17 (0.06)*** 0.35 (0.17)** -0.15 (0.09)* 
         SADV  (Advertising signal) 0.01 (0.00)*** 0.12 (0.05)** -0.01 (0.03) 
Fundamental signal predictor variables     
         SINV (inventory) -0.00 (0.00) 0.10 (0.04)*** 0.07 (0.02)*** 
         SAR (accounts receivable) 0.00 (0.01) 0.05 (0.07) -0.05 (0.04) 
         SGM (gross margin) -0.15 (0.01)*** -1.59 (0.15)*** 0.38 (0.09)*** 
         SPSG&A (SG&A-ADV) -0.09 (0.01)*** -1.07 (0.12)*** 0.19 (0.07)*** 
Accounting/Finance control variables    
         ETR (effective tax rate) 0.11 (0.03)*** 0.56 (0.41) -0.30 (0.25) 
         d_EPS (annual change in EPS) 0.03 (0.00)*** 0.04 (0.03) -0.05 (0.02)** 
         SIZE (firm size) 0.02 (0.00)*** 0.43 (0.05)*** 0.10 (0.03)*** 
         EAR_VAR (earnings variability) -0.00 (0.00)* -0.00 (0.00)* -0.01 (0.00)*** 
         PRND (R&D intensity) -0.08 (0.01)*** -0.69 (0.20)*** -0.26 (0.13)** 
         AGE (firm age) 0.00 (0.10) -0.34 (0.09)*** 0.22 (0.06)*** 
Serial correlation ( ρ ) - 0.47 0.57 
Overall R-sq (Within) 0.18 (0.25) 0.13 (0.21) 0.13 (0.15) 
Number of firms (observations) 782 (3741) 608 (2959) 608 (2959) 
F (d.f.) 33.3 (29,2930) 21.4 (28,2323) 14.9 (28,2323) 
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED MODEL PREDICTOR VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
AND MEASURES  
  
We define the measures for the various predictor variables in the following way 
for each firm i for each of the 19 five-year moving window. Note that all the variables 
have a subscript i for each firm. 
Variable Definition Measure 
 
 
Advertising/Sales 
 
The 5-year moving average  
of advertising/sales.  
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Dividend Payout  5-year moving average of 
Cash Dividends /Earnings 
 
Growth  5-year moving average of 
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Leverage  5-year moving average of 
Total Senior Securities 
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Bonds)/Total Assets 
 
Liquidity  5-year moving average of 
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Asset Size  5-year moving average of 
Total Assets 
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Earnings-Price Ratio (        ) 
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Firm Age Number of years since the 
stock’s first listing on the 
stock market 
- 
Competitive Intensity The four-firm Herfindahl’s  
concentration index  
Proportion of market share of the top 
four firms in the industry defined by 
two digits of  the standard industrial 
classification (SIC) code. 
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APPENDIX B: COMPUSTAT DATA ITEMS USED IN CONSTRUCTING 
VARIABLES 
 
 
Name of Variable Component 
 
COMPUSTAT Annual Data Items 
Advertising/Sales DATA45/DATA12 
Research and Development (R&D)/Sales DATA46/DATA12 
Total Assets   DATA6 
Income Available for Common Stockholders  DATA20 
Market Value of Common Stock (Pt) DATA24× DATA25×1000 
Total Senior Securities (TotalSecurity) DATA5+DATA9+DATA10 
Current Asset (CurrentAsset) DATA4 
Current Liabilities (CurrentLiability) DATA5 
Cash Dividends (CashDividend) DATA21 
  
Herfindahl’s concentration index DATA12 
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APPENDIX C: SPECIFICATION OF VARIABLES IN 2SLS MODELS 
a
∆DATA(X) is defined as )(/))()(( XDATAXDATAXDATA − , where )(XDATA  is the average of the previous two years’ DATA(X).   
bPit-1 is the share price at the beginning month of return accumulation period (see the Appendix E for an explanation of return accumulation periods.).  
Variables Sources Variable Constructs 
SADV COMPUSTAT ∆DATA(12)
a  - ∆DATA(45) 
SINV COMPUSTAT ∆DATA(78) (or ∆DATA(3))  - ∆DATA(12) 
SGM COMPUSTAT ∆DATA(12) - ∆(DATA(12) – DATA(41)) 
SAR COMPUSTAT ∆DATA(2) - ∆DATA(12) 
SPSG&A COMPUSTAT ∆(DATA(189) – DATA(45)) - ∆DATA(12) 
EPS COMPUSTAT DATA(58) / Pit-1
b 
ETR COMPUSTAT/CRSP {DATA(170)/Pit-1}×(Tt-1 - Tt), Tt = DATA(63)/{DATA(18)+(63)+(49)-(48)-(55)} 
SIZE CRSP log(abs(PRC) * SHROUT); PRC = closing price, SHROUT = number of shares outstanding 
BTM COMPUSTAT DATA(60) / {DATA(199)×DATA(25)}   
PRND COMPUSTAT ∑
=
+−−
5
1
1))46()(211)(1.0(
s
sitDATAs  
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APPENDIX D: SPECIFICATION OF VARIABLES IN FORECAST ERROR MODEL 
    a Pit-1 is the share price at the beginning month of return accumulation periods (see the Appendix E about return accumulation periods.). 
   b EPS is AEPS.  In case of missing AEPS, we used DATA(58) in COMPUSTAT.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Sources Variable Constructs 
AEPS I/B/E/S  ACTUAL; actual reported earnings per share   
FEPS I/B/E/S  MEDEST; median estimate of forecasts, reported most recently before 4 months after fiscal 
year-end 
FERR I/B/E/S  (ACTUAL – MEDEST) / Pit-1
a 
AGE CRSP log(number of monthly stock returns taped in CRSP)  
d_EPS COMPUSTAT & CRSP (DATA(58) – L_DATA(58)) / Pit-1; L_ = one-year-lagged 
EAR_VAR 
COMPUSTAT & 
I/B/E/S  ))((/4/))((
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APPENDIX E: TIME FRAME FOR THE CALCULATION OF CAR AND PVE 
 
 
a
FYEt is fiscal-year end for a firm in year t.  FYEt -8 is 8 months before the FYEt and FYEt +4 is 4 months after the FYEt. 
 
 
 
Pit-1(FYEt -8) FYEt FYEt-1
a 
Return accumulation periods  
for CARit (FYEt -8 to FYEt +4) 
Periods for PVEit (FYEt to FYEt +4): consensus median 
EPS forecasts for t+1,t+2,…, t+5.  
FYEt +4 
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APPENDIX F: DEFINIATIONS OF CAR AND PVE  
 
Annual cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR).  Because firms typically issue their 
annual reports a few months after fiscal year-end, it is the custom in the accounting and 
finance literature to assume that annual reports are issued sometime between fiscal year-
end and 4 months after fiscal year-end.  Because we want our measure of the value of 
firm i in year t ( itCAR ) to reflect information from the annual report that firm i issued at 
the end of year t-1, we begin the accumulation period 4 months after i’s fiscal year-end t-
1 (which is 8 months before i’s fiscal year-end t, FYEt -8).  Hence, itCAR  is measured as 
the sum of monthly abnormal stock returns (i.e., ititit RRAR −= , where itR  is actual and 
itR  is expected return) from 8 months before to 4 months after i’s fiscal year-end t (from 
FYEt -8 to FYEt +4), which is our “return accumulation period.”   
For the expected return for a stock at end of month t, we apply the three factor 
model of Fama and French (1993).  Fama and French (1993) have consistently found that 
the factors describing “size” and “value”, outside of market factor in the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), significantly improved the prediction of realized stock returns of 
publicly traded stocks.  The three factor model was constructed as follows using monthly 
value-weighted market return, risk-free rate, monthly size factor (SMB) and value factor 
(HML) provided by French’s website (See Fama and French (1993) about the details of 
how to measure SMB and HML.).  
 
(6)  ittitiftmtiftit HMLSMBRRRR εβββ +++−+= 321 )(    
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where,  
;,..,1;,..,1 iTtNi == iT  is FYEi-8;  
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, where itR is ex post rate of return for stock i during period t; 
mtR = 

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
−1'
'ln
it
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L
, where an index of the ex post value-weighted return for all NYSE firms 
during month t (i.e., the market rate of return); 
ftR = Risk free return at month t (one month Treasury-bill rate from Ibbotson 
Associates); 
tSMB = Return to relative size (market capitalization); 
tHML = Return to relative price-to-book ratio; itε  ~ i.i.d. ),0( 2σN . 
For the expected return ( itR ) during the month t, we estimate the three factor 
model (equation 6) with 60 ex post historical monthly returns before FYEt -8.
25  Then, we 
predict return at the end of the month t using the estimated coefficients 
( 321 ˆ,ˆ,ˆ iii βββ ), tSMB , and tHML  for a month t in return accumulation period (from 
FYEt -8 to FYEt +4).  Hence, the expected return for a month t is calculated as follows: 
 
(7) titiftmtiftit HMLSMBRRRR 321 ˆˆ)(ˆ βββ ++−+=  
where t = FYEit-8, … ,FYEit+4; Ni ,....,1=  
                                                 
25 While it was our goal to use 60 monthly stock returns in this estimation, it sometimes happened that 
missing data caused us to have fewer than 60 observations in a 5-year period.  In no case did we estimate 
with fewer than 24 observations in the 5-year period. 
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Finally, the annual cumulative abnormal stock return, itCAR , for a firm i at year t 
is measured as follows:     
(8) )(
4
8
∑
+
−=
−=
FYEi
FYEis
isisit RRCAR      Ni ,....,1=  
 
The present value of future earnings forecasts (PVE).  The procedure to calculate PVE 
is summarized as follows: 
(9)  15
5
1'
)'( /]/)}([{ −
=
+∑ += ititit
t
ttiit PDFEPSPVE ρ   ,  
(10)  itFtit R βρ )03.0(1 ++= , ;,....,1;,....,1 iTtNi ==  
where )'( ttiFEPS +  (t’ = 1,2,…,5) are consensus median forecasts of earnings (reported in 
I/B/E/S summary history) for the years (t+1, t+2, …, t+5), made most recently in between 
FYEt  and FYEt +4, itD  is the dividend (DATA26 in COMPUSTAT) at year t, itρ  is the 
discount factor for firm i in year t, and FtR  is the risk-free rate in year t (Amir et al. 2003).   
We selected median forecasts (FEPS) for five consecutive years which were 
released most recently before the end of the return accumulation periods (FYEt +4).  
Using median forecasts made most recently between FYEt and FYEt +4, we ensured that 
the information from annual financial statements for year t-1 and stock price changes 
after the release of annual reports were available to financial analysts.  In the case of 
missing forecasts for any of the subsequent five years, we replaced the missing forecast 
with the forecast of earnings for the previous year times a five-year earnings growth rate 
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forecast.26  We also combined the consensus forecasts of earnings for each year in the 
future with the expected future dividend, itD , assuming that the expected future dividend 
is the same as the current dividend (Amir et al. 2003).  Then, the present value of future 
earnings forecasts for a firm at a year t is determined by discounting the forecasted future 
earnings plus expected future dividends, with the firm’s cost of capital, itρ  ; hence, the 
discounted sum is }/){( '
5
1'
)'(
t
it
it
t
tti DFEPS ρ∑
=
+ + .  Finally, the present value (PVE) was 
deflated by share price ( 1−itP ) at 8 months before the end of the fiscal year (FYEt -8). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 For example, if EPS forecast for t+3 (FEPSt+3) is missing but there exists earnings growth rate (g), we 
replaced the missing FEPSt+3 with FEPSt+2 * (1+g), following Amir et al. (2003). 
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